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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to determine to what degree there are textual and 
conceptual similarities between the British National Party’s (BNP) and UK 
Independence Party’s (UKIP) construction of in-groups and out-groups. The focus 
is on the two discursive strategies nomination (attribution of word form) and 
predication (attribution of quality). 
For the present study I adopt the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical 
Discourse Analysis, which offers a broad sociologic understanding of linguistic 
phenomena through historical contextualization. The data consist of a corpus 
containing news articles and policy documents from official BNP and UKIP 
outputs. 
The in-group analysis shows that both parties have gained in confidence 
between the 2005 and 2010 general elections, which is mirrored in their choice of 
party name as preferred form of self-representation. When claiming uniqueness, 
both parties mix ideological themes with concrete policies, but UKIP claims 
ownership of more banal policies. While the BNP and UKIP criticize each other, 
the main recipients of their criticism are the establishment parties. Both parties 
feel the need to distance themselves from accusations of racism; the BNP in 
particular. 
The out-group analysis shows that both parties frequently discuss immigration 
and refer to immigrants using the same word forms, although UKIP’s use is more 
consistent with internationally agreed definitions. Both parties construct 
immigration as unstoppable forces, e.g. by using water metaphors. References to 
country of origin are also frequent; UKIP emphasizes Eastern European 
immigration while the BNP highlights immigration from the Third World. 
Overall, the analysis shows that both parties use language extensively to 
distinguish between in-groups and out-groups, but that UKIP’s parameters are 
more fine-tuned. 
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1 Introduction 
Right-wing nationalism has gained momentum after years of financial instability, 
and in most European countries extreme-right parties are now represented in 
either local, regional or national assemblies. Hungarian Jobbik in the East, French 
Front National in the West, Italian Lega Nord in the South and Danish Dansk 
Folkeparti in the North; all over Europe, right-wing and nationalist parties are 
cashing in on people’s worries about the future by offering an ideology that 
entails considerably more than just increased national pride. Even in Germany, 
where fascism was thought never to be able to root again, the Nazi 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands is now represented in a couple of 
regional parliaments. Despite this growth in nationalist sentiment in Europe, 
research on the topic has been carried out almost exclusively in the fields of 
sociology and political science, with few linguistic forays. 
In Britain, far-right organizations have been operating since the 1920s. Despite 
this, no such organization would enjoy electoral success until the beginning of the 
21st century. This paper is concerned with the language produced by the British 
National Party (BNP) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The BNP is to this 
date the most successful far-right extremist party in the history of British politics, 
and has also managed to win representation in the European Parliament. UKIP, 
which has been dubbed “the BNP in blazers” (Hinsliff, 2004, 30 May), has 
experienced success in the European elections and has benefited from a number of 
high-profile defections from established parties. 
Until recently, few linguists have taken an interest in the discourse of the BNP, 
and academic interest in UKIP is still at a level where researchers are primarily 
concerned with the party’s demographics and electoral profile. Despite the 
absence of research on UKIP discourse, academics have compared UKIP to the 
BNP. My reason to compare the language of these two parties stems from a 
paradox present in much of the literature on the British far-right regarding the link 
between the parties’ political classification and their discourse. John and Margetts 
(2009), for example, manage to balance two seemingly contradictory claims. They 
say that, on the one hand, the BNP and UKIP have used the same discourse when 
discussing immigration and national identity. On the other hand, this does not 
really make UKIP extreme (p. 501). Their subsequent statement that “UKIP draws 
upon the same source of social and political attitudes among the public as the 
BNP” (p. 508) makes me question their previous language-related conclusion, and 
also highlights the need for further comparative discourse studies before making 
statements on discursive similarity. A comparison of the BNP and UKIP is also 
motivated by the current electoral situation; while UKIP is gaining momentum the 
BNP has seemingly ceased to be an electoral force. It is plausible to assume that 
when BNP support decreases, UKIP will attract further support from the far-right. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine to what degree there are textual and 
conceptual similarities between the BNP’s and UKIP’s construction of in-groups 
and out-groups. Papers dealing with this phenomenon are typically concerned 
either with an in-group or an out-group. In this paper, however, I use the 
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Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak, 2001, 
2009; Reisigl and Wodak. 2001, 2009) and corpus analysis to investigate how the 
parties use the discursive strategies nomination (attribution of identifying word 
form) and predication (attribution of quality) to construct both their in-group and 
out-groups. For this paper I have compiled a corpus containing news articles and 
policy documents published on the BNP’s and UKIP’s websites between 2005 
and 2012. The application of corpus methodologies to discourse analysis is 
particularly suited for this kind of lexical inquiries as it allows me to discover 
lexical patterns and explain them through the lens of social and historical 
contextualization. 
The in-group analysis is concerned with the parties’ representation and 
perception of themselves and each other. I investigate the distribution of word 
forms of self-representation in party-voter interaction and how the parties’ 
preference of party name over the pronoun we can be seen as an indicator of 
increased self-confidence and as an attempt to distance themselves from the 
mainstream parties. In the analysis of self-image I identify the areas in which the 
parties claim to have unique competence, what attributes they do not want to be 
associated with and how they perceive each other’s existence. An image emerges 
of two parties that make similar claims to competence, but which diverge in terms 
of types of policies. The analysis also shows that the parties are aware of external 
critique, and that this has had an impact on the parties’ self-projection. 
The out-group analysis is concerned with the parties’ construction of their 
immigration discourses, and the focus is on immigration nomenclature, 
quantification and origin. I investigate how the word forms asylum seeker, 
immigrant and refugee are used in order to create a negative image of 
immigration, but I also discover that refugee is used as a technical term in UKIP 
discourse. I find that immigrants are frequently quantified, but that general, vague 
collocates and water metaphors are preferred over exact specifications. Finally, I 
set out to triangulate where the parties claim that “immigrant waves” come from, 
and find that both parties frequently discuss immigration in relation to country of 
origin, but that the BNP and UKIP emphasize Third World and Eastern European 
descent respectively. The out-group analysis shows that there are many 
similarities between the parties’ conceptualizations of immigration and that the 
differences are formal rather than functional. 
I start by providing the ideological and political background of the BNP and 
UKIP, followed by a discussion of previous relevant literature. My aim and 
research questions are presented in 1.3. Chapter 2 contains a description of my 
theoretical framework and methodological approach. 2.1 is concerned with 
discourse theory. In 2.1.1 I summarize cognitive approaches to discourse analysis. 
2.1.2 contains an outline of my conceptual framework, the Discourse-Historical 
Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis. The analytical dichotomy in-group and 
out-group is discussed in 2.2. Corpus analytical methods used in this thesis are 
described in 2.3. Chapter 3 contains a description of my corpus and a motivation 
of my choice of reference corpus. In chapter 4 I analyze the construction of the 
parties’ in-group. Aspects covered in this chapter are forms of self-reference (4.1), 
claims of unique competence (4.2.1), negation of attributes (4.2.2) and mutual 
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perceptions (4.2.3). In chapter 5 I analyze the construction of out-groups. The 
analysis focuses on immigration terminology (5.2), quantification (5.3) and origin 
(5.4). Chapter 6 contains a summary of the analysis, conclusions and suggestion 
for further studies. 
 
1.1 The political and ideological contexts of the BNP and UKIP 
The BNP and UKIP are two relatively young nationalist parties located on the 
right of the political spectrum. By comparing the parties’ own descriptions of 
themselves, their basic motivation appears to be the same. In its party constitution, 
UKIP describes itself as a 
 
[p]arty [that] believes that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland […] should only be governed by her own citizens and that its governance 
shall at all times be conducted first and foremost in the interests of the United 
Kingdom and its peoples[…]. 
(UKIP 1) 
 
The feeling that national independence has been lost and that it has to be 
retaken is central also in BNP texts, although here, ethnicity is an important 
variable. 
 
Our party is a party of British Nationalism, both ethnic and civic, and we are 
committed to the principle of national sovereignty in all our British Homeland 
affairs and of self determination and sovereignty in all Indigenous British affairs. 
(BNP, 2010, p. 7, original emphasis) 
 
In the political and sociological literature, scholars use various terms to brand 
the parties ideologically and politically; anthropologist Holmes (2000) even 
struggles to fix British fascism on the left-right spectrum. This is so because of the 
extreme right’s increased interest in welfare questions (albeit only for a 
designated part of the population) and the general decline of the left. This has 
seemingly resulted in a political reality in which parties like the BNP are able to 
claim legitimacy and to hold multiple political positions simultaneously (p. 114). 
Political scientists typically assign the BNP various ideological-political 
compound labels such as extreme right (e.g. Copsey, 2008, 2011; Linehan, 2005) 
or far-right (e.g. Gottlieb, 2004; Copsey, 2011; Linehan, 2005; Rhodes, 2009; 
Goodwin, 2011). Fascist has also been frequently used (e.g. Copsey, 2004, 2011; 
Goodwin, 2011; Holmes, 2000; Richardson, 2011). Labels describing UKIP 
include populist and anti-establishment (e.g. Evans and Goodwin, 2012; Cutts et 
al., 2012; Loomes et al., 2011). Evans and Goodwin (2012) brand both parties 
xenophobic and Eurosceptic. Based on questionnaire data provided by UKIP 
candidates for the 2009 European Parliament election and the 2009 general 
election, Loomes et al. (2011) suggest that UKIP’s political position on the left-
right spectrum is relative and best understood as somewhere between the centre-
 4 
right Conservatives and the more extreme BNP, which they position right next to 
UKIP (pp. 744-746). Evans and Goodwin (2012) agree with this view and 
conclude that there are several similarities between the two parties, but that the 
BNP is “associated more strongly with ideological extremism, criminality and 
violence” while UKIP “advocate similar policies in many areas but would 
strongly reject any association with extremism and violence” (p. 6). Others, such 
as Abedi and Lundberg (2009) do not consider UKIP to be extreme and rather opt 
for the term anti-political establishment. UKIP is not listed as a racist party by the 
anti-fascist organization Unite Against Fascism or the anti-fascist campaign Hope 
not Hate. Bjurwald (2011), however, includes UKIP on her list of extreme-right 
and xenophobic parties in Europe with the motivation that individual members 
exhibit xenophobic behaviour (p. 308). 
It is possible to connect the current BNP to an older namesake, but also to 
fascist organizations operating in interwar Britain; a span of almost a hundred 
years. Historian Cross (1961) was one of the first scholars to give an academic 
account of the acts of right-wing politicians John Bean, founder of the National 
Labour Party, and Colin Jordan, founder of the White Defence League (p. 199), 
both in 1957. In 1960, these two parties would merge and form the British 
National Party, which eventually dissolved in 1967 (Walker, 1977, p. 67). Both 
men were closely linked to Arnold Leese, the founder of the Imperial Fascist 
League in 1929, and to John Tyndall, who would go on to form the current BNP 
in 1982. Under Tyndall’s leadership the party had a more anti-Semitic character. 
Scholars such as Richardson (2011) claim that anti-Semitism is still a vital 
element of the party’s ideology, but that such discussions now take place 
internally or on Internet fora (pp. 39ff). The incumbent chairman, Nick Griffin, 
was elected in 1999 and soon set out to modernize the party in order to gain 
legitimacy. The anti-Semitic elements have been downplayed, though the party 
remains anti-Zionist (e.g. BNP, 2005, pp. 51f). Instead, Muslim immigrants in 
Britain and Europe have been made the new targets of nationalist disapproval. 
The BNP advocates a complete halt to immigration in order to take back the land 
from “Third World colonizers” and to give it back to the “indigenous Britons”. 
Discussions of what constitutes “indigenous” or British are common (see 
Richardson, 2011). Up until 2009 the party had a whites-only policy. 
UKIP was founded by Alan Sked, Professor in International History at the 
London School of Economics, in 1993. UKIP’s history can be traced back to the 
Anti-Federalist League, a group formed to campaign against the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991. In its constitution, the party describes itself as civic 
nationalist and distances itself from ethnic nationalism (UKIP 2). Besides the EU, 
perceived threats include Marxism, multiculturalism and Islamification. Unlike 
the BNP, UKIP has had a number of leaders over the years. The incumbent, Nigel 
Farage, also a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for South East 
England, led the party from 2006 to 2009 and was re-elected in 2010. Just like the 
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BNP, UKIP members see themselves as victims of political correctness and media 
bias
1
. 
The BNP and UKIP are small parties and have not won any seats in the House 
of Commons, and are unlikely to do so unless the current first-past-the-post 
system is replaced by proportional representation. However, UKIP holds three 
seats in the House of Lords due to defections. UKIP won its first three seats in the 
European Parliament in 1999, and quadrupled the number of seats in 2004. The 
BNP had its first two MEPs elected in 2009 (Party Chairman Nick Griffin and 
Andrew Brons, now leader of the British Democratic Party) while UKIP made its 
best election so far, pulling 16.5% of the British votes, which translates into 
thirteen seats (since then, one MEP has been expelled, another has defected to the 
Conservatives). In the 2010 general election, neither party managed to win any 
seats in the Commons. Psephologically, however, both the BNP and UKIP had 
their strongest showings so far, pulling 1.9 and 3.1% of the votes cast 
respectively. The BNP is thus the fifth biggest party in Britain, UKIP the fourth. 
Although a plethora of fascist organizations have operated in Britain since the 
First World War, they have had little electoral success. Oswald Mosley, the face 
of interwar British fascism, never pulled more than 0.2% in the 1931 general 
election with his New Party (Linehan, p. 88). His British Union of Fascists, 
founded in 1932, never stood in a general election at all. Before the 2010 election, 
the biggest electoral success enjoyed by an extreme-right party was in 1979 when 
the National Front won 1.3% of the votes in the general election (Copsey, 2008, p. 
20). 
The BNP has had some success in local elections over the last decade but lost 
many of its councillors in the 2010, 2011 and 2012 elections and does now only 
have two seats, as compared to UKIP’s 32. These massive electoral losses have 
resulted in political scientists taking a more relaxed approach to the BNP (e.g. 
Copsey, 2011, pp. 6-8) or even declaring the party dead as an electoral force (e.g. 
Evans and Goodwin, 2012). Bear in mind that not long ago, Copsey (2004) 
claimed that the party was close to attaining legitimacy (p. 167). John and 
Margetts (2009) warn that that the latent support for the BNP is constantly big, 
while others, such as Messina (2011) see such claims as overestimations of the 
support for the far-right (p. 186). 
1.2 Review of academic responses to the far-right 
The first major academic responses to the BNP came only a decade ago, and 
understandably, most research on the far-right in general has been carried out by 
historians, political scientists and sociologists. Historian Nigel Copsey published 
his pivotal British Fascism: The British National Party and the quest for 
legitimacy, in which he gives an account of the party’s history, in 2004. A new 
edition was published in 2008 amid the fear that the BNP would make its way into 
                                                 
1
 This is particularly true of the BNP, which considers almost all broadsheets and tabloids (not to 
mention the BBC and its flagship Panorama) to be anti-BNP. The decline in circulation of British 
newspapers is often reported on the BNP website as a sign of increase in BNP support. 
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the European Parliament. It would take another few years before there were any 
academic responses to UKIP or comparisons between the two parties. 
Linguistic approaches to the contemporary far-right in Britain have been 
sparse but generally of high quality. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to 
UKIP. This is, however, not an issue endemic to linguistics. Cutts et al. (2012) 
note that, while some research has been carried out on voter pattern and party 
organization, systematic research on UKIP has not been prioritized (p. 204f). 
Discourse analyses of the far-right often focus on the discursive creation and 
maintenance of contrast, masking and moderation of racist language and use of 
metaphor. An attempt to define racist discourse has been undertaken by van Dijk 
(1987), who provides an attitude schema containing four “topic classes”, which 
can be said to be the centrality factors or essential components of racist discourse 
(p. 58). 
 
1. They are different 
2. They do not adapt 
3. They are involved in negative acts 
4. They threaten our socioeconomic interests 
 
It is hard to prove that these are the only essential components of racist 
discourse, and there is bound to be some overlapping with definitions of other 
isms. These classes are just the essential abstractions of a greater number of 
characteristics, or more precisely, prejudices, which makes van Dijk’s definition 
an example of a check-list approach rather than an essentialist approach to racism 
(see 2.1.1 for a discussion of essentialist and check-list approaches). As my 
analysis will show, all four of van Dijk’s classes are frequently expressed in BNP 
and UKIP discourse. What is interesting to note here is van Dijk’s use of 
pronouns; prejudice is essentially defined as the differentiation between us and 
them. 
The distinction between in-groups and out-groups is discussed in Richardson 
(2011), who distinguishes between discursive surface and depth. He contends that 
“discourse of fascist parties seeking mass electoral support is inherently 
duplicitous, claiming one thing while the party is committed to something else” 
(p. 38). Richardson warns us that if we only focus on manifestos and other texts 
aimed at potential voters, an extreme party like the BNP might actually come 
across as operating within established and acceptable limits of right-wing politics 
(p. 42f). This echoes the methodological credo in Duverger’s (1964) seminal 
Political Parties, namely that “[c]onstitutions and rules never give more than a 
partial idea of what happens, if indeed they describe reality at all” (xvi). Another 
recent reiteration of this claim has been made by Goodwin (2008), who is strongly 
in favour of an actor-driven approach to the far-right. Richardson’s (2011) 
conclusions that the BNP is still intrinsically anti-Semitic, but that this manifests 
itself differently at surface and depth level, is the result of a comparison of BNP 
texts written at different points in time (p. 39). That some form of comparison is 
needed in order to understand how fascist discourse is reproduced is clear. 
Edwards (2012) does this by comparing the BNP’s 2005 and 2010 general 
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election manifestos. By comparing frequency of party name and pronouns, he 
paints a picture of a party that is becoming increasingly confident. Edwards sees 
the increase of references to the British nation on behalf of references to the 
British people as an attempt to “adopt a more statesmanlike approach by invoking 
the authority of nationhood” (p. 251). 
Political scientists Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2010) explain the 
mollification of BNP discourse as a result of emulation of UKIP discourse. The 
BNP has borrowed copiously from UKIP, particularly the concept of freedom (p. 
589). The conception of the BNP as a parasite party, siphoning political energy 
from others, is an eye-opening one. The party’s “borrowing” of discursive matter 
has been highlighted by Richardson and Wodak (2009), who describe how the 
BNP has claimed the phrase “British jobs for British workers” as its own 
following a speech delivered by Gordon Brown. In the hands of the BNP, British 
has come to be used as a formal realization of an in-group with racist overtones, 
referring exclusively to whites
2
 (p. 262). They argue that the BNP’s use of the 
phrase is a recontextualization of formally and functionally similar phrases, e.g. 
the British Fascists’ “Britain for the British”, used in prewar British far-right 
politics to construct Jews as an alien life form. Richardson and Wodak argue that 
instead of excluding Jews from the concept of Britishness, the phrase has now 
taken on anti-Muslim and anti-Black meaning (p. 256). 
While Richardson and Wodak (2009) have identified an important and 
interesting shift, their analysis oversimplifies interwar fascist organizations’ 
construction of non-British out-groups. Early fascist groups, such as the British 
Fascists or the British Empire Union, were at least initially mainly concerned with 
the maintenance of the Empire and the fight against Bolsheviks, which would 
entail that the phrase “Britain for the British” also sought to exclude anti-imperial 
elements as well as Jews (for an overview of the anti-Bolshevism of the interwar 
far-right, see Linehan, 2000). The slowly changing meaning of British in the 
hands of the far-right and the reconfiguration of the out-group is illustrated by 
Richardson’s (2013) analysis of the conceptualization of Britishness in the 
newspaper COMBAT, published by the 1960’s BNP and its progenitor the 
National Labour Party (NLP). The 1960’s conceptualization can be seen as an 
intermediate stage between the prewar and contemporary meaning of British. In 
the 1960s, white was used interchangeably with British, but it was still the Jews 
rather than the Muslims who were the chosen targets of disapproval. 
Disappointment with the declining status of the Empire had been replaced with 
disappointment with the Commonwealth, which the NLP wanted to replace with a 
“new Union of the white dominions” (Richardson, 2013, pp. 186f). 
Out-groups are complex in the sense that they are not homogenous. The 
current BNP’s complex conceptualization of out-groups can be seen in Figure 1, 
where the interwar notion of the Bolshevik conspiracy is combined with the more 
contemporary paranoia concerning an Islamic invasion of Europe. 
                                                 
2
 It should be pointed out that approaches to the BNP emphasizing the homogeneity of the 
electorate have been criticized, for example by Rhodes (2011) who concludes that there is no 
“shared position or universal understanding of whiteness and white identity” among BNP voters 
(p. 114). 
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Figure 1. BNP distortions of the BBC logo. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 is a prime example of the paranoia that is so typical of the BNP’s out-
group construction. In this image, downloaded from the official BNP website, the 
out-group has an ethnic and a politico-cultural anatomy, just like in the prewar 
and 1960’s conceptualizations. Just like Richardson and Wodak (2009) pointed 
out, there has been a shift in ethnic focus from Jews to Muslims, but the fear of 
the left, signalled by the hammer and sickle in the fake BBC logo shown in Figure 
1, is still present. 
Charteris-Black (2006) takes an interest in the rhetorical function of metaphor 
in right-wing discourse. Using a corpus compiled from BNP and Conservative 
sources as well as right-wing news paper texts, he finds that both parties, as well 
as the media, persistently use metaphor in relation to immigration, particularly 
container metaphors and metaphors of natural disasters. He also discovers that, 
while the media make use of both, the centre-right tends to favour container 
metaphors while the far-right uses metaphors of natural disasters. The underlying 
function of these metaphors, according to Chartis-Black, is to “discourage 
sympathy with immigrants by treating them as objects rather than as the subjects 
of life stories” (p. 569). Of the natural disaster metaphors, water movement is of 
particular importance for the present study and will be discussed in 5.3. An 
increase in water stands for an increase in immigration, but Chartis-Black asserts 
that tidal metaphors are also inextricably linked to repatriation, with the 
withdrawal of water serving to naturalize the sending home of immigrants (p. 
571). Regarding the magnitude of the metaphorical disaster, Chartis-Black sums it 
up with the axiom “the greater the disaster the further to the right” (p. 569). 
1.3 Aim and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to determine to what extent there are textual and 
conceptual similarities between the BNP’s and UKIP’s construction of in-groups 
and out-groups. It is my hope that this approach can be applied also to critical 
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studies of political organizations operating in other national and ideological 
contexts. I seek to answer this overarching question: 
 
 To what extent are there formal and functional similarities between the discourses 
of the BNP and UKIP?
3
 
 
I operationalize this rather wide aim by focusing on how the BNP and UKIP 
construct in-groups and out-groups through the use of the discursive strategies 
nomination (attribution of form of identification) and predication (attribution of 
characteristics, qualities and features). Four questions are central to this thesis. 
 
In-group  What word forms do the parties use in order to express 
themselves? 
  What unique self-image do the parties convey? 
 
Out-group  What word forms do the parties use in order to represent 
and describe immigration? 
  What aspects do the parties foreground in their description 
of immigration? 
 
The two in-groups with which this study is concerned are the BNP and UKIP 
themselves
4
. I have chosen to focus on immigration as the out-group partly 
because of the fact that the BNP and UKIP are anti-immigration parties, but also 
because of the applicability of the word. Immigration as an umbrella term is 
heterogeneous and fuzzy and in this context therefore in need of clarification. 
The first question in each pair is concerned with the attribution of word form 
to actors or organizations. In the analysis of the in-group I investigate the parties’ 
choice of word form of self-reference. In the analysis of the out-groups the 
question is rather what word forms the parties use when referring to immigrants. 
The second question in each pair is concerned with the attribution of 
characteristics, qualities and features to actors or organizations. When the parties 
use this discursive strategy they seek either to project a positive image of 
themselves (the in-group), e.g. by claiming unique competence in policy areas, or 
to project a negative image of their opponents (the out-group) e.g. by attributing 
negative characteristics to them. 
                                                 
3
 The dichotomy formal-functional is further elaborated in 2.1.2. 
4
 The BNP and UKIP are of course each other’s out-group, and so is every other political party. 
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2 Discourse theory and corpus methodology 
In this study I carry out a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) aided by corpus 
linguistics methods. In terms of methodology, this thesis is a marriage of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Baker et al. (2008) have referred to this 
marriage as a “useful methodological synergy” (p. 273f). The relation between 
corpus linguistics and CDA works in two directions. Corpus software can be used 
in order to retrieve instances of phenomena typically discussed in CDA, and then 
provide frequencies and other statistical data. The other way is to search for 
phenomena not typically associated with CDA, and then apply a CDA framework 
(p. 285). The methodological synthesis proposed by Baker et al. (2008) is 
particularly suited for this investigation as it allows lexical patterns to be the point 
of departure for a social study. Moreover, the combination of corpus linguistics 
and CDA bridges the gap between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and it 
can also be argued that the incorporation of quantitative methods reduce 
researcher bias. 
In this chapter I introduce the discourse-theoretical framework and corpus 
linguistic methodology underpinning the analysis. In 2.1 I discuss my theoretical 
framework. The chapter is divided into a section 2.1.1 which is concerned with 
discourse as an unarticulated system of concepts and a section 2.1.2 in which the 
Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, which is the 
framework adopted for this study, is presented. In 2.2 I discuss the analytical 
perspectives in-group and out-group and state what linguistic features I will 
investigate. Finally, 2.3 contains a description of the corpus analytical tools used 
in the analysis. 
2.1 Discourse theory 
This chapter starts with an account of cognitive approaches to discourse, 
particularly theories of semantic storage. The discussion of the unarticulated 
systematization of conceptual and encyclopaedic knowledge in 2.1.1 draws upon 
the works by Fillmore (1982), Lakoff (2008) and Langacker (1987). In 2.1.2 I 
outline the theoretical framework used for this study, the Discourse-Historical 
Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, which draws upon the work by Wodak 
(2001; 2009) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2009). 
2.1.1 Cognitive approaches to discourse 
Discourses never exist in isolation but are intertwined in complex networks, 
known as interdiscursivity. Similarly, concepts do not exist in isolation. There 
have been many attempts to explain exactly how we store and retrieve conceptual 
information. Fillmore (1982) uses the term frame to refer to a comprehensive 
system of knowledge that we use in order to make sense of the world. More 
precisely, a frame is “any system of concepts related in such a way that to 
understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which 
 11 
it fits” (p. 111). Some of Fillmore’s exemplifications of topics discussed in lexical 
semantics can be extrapolated to discourse analysis, where they are highly 
relevant. One of these topics concerns reframing of lexical sets. Fillmore notes 
that in the case of the word pairings boy-man and girl-woman, there is lag in the 
lexical transition from girl to woman, while boys tend to be identified as men at an 
earlier age. As Fillmore points out, this asymmetry points at negative attitudes 
towards women (p. 126). An implicit application of frames in this manner is 
carried out in a longitudinal corpus study by Baker (2010b), who studies the 
distribution of Mrs, Miss and Ms in British corpora. He concludes that there is an 
increase in the use of the word forms boy and girl as lexical representations of 
adults, but that the number is considerably higher for women than for men (p. 
139). 
Lakoff (2008) has adapted frame semantics for studies of political discourse. 
Discourse (Lakoff calls it narrative) is structured by smaller entities, frames, 
which are neural circuits capable of structuring thought (p. 22). While frames are 
simple in nature, they can be combined into more complex, perhaps even 
contradictory structures. Lakoff exemplifies this with the compound field hospital; 
a patient and a doctor may both be soldiers, but while one tries to save lives, the 
other is paid to end them (p. 23). The relation between neurobiology and political 
language is further investigated by Lakoff and Wehling (2012). They argue that 
an understanding of the complex neural networks of the brain, and the knowledge 
that the activation of one concept triggers a larger set of related concepts, are 
necessary in order to understand politics (p. 29). All political frames are moral, 
and it is the politicians’ task to connect mundane issues to these larger, moral 
frames (pp. 9, 13). Swing voting can be explained by the presence of a complex 
circuitry, whose different frames are triggered by politically coloured language (p. 
14). Political conceptualization is hierarchical, and discursive success hinges on 
the ability to activate a moral frame through mentioning of specific issues, 
something which Lakoff and Wehling insist that conservatives do better than 
liberals (pp. 29, 35). 
On a lexical level, the activation of frames can be compared to the notion of 
discourse prosody and semantic preference. Stubbs (2001) defines semantic 
prosody as a relationship between a lemma and a set of semantically related 
words, easily labelled according to quality or function (p. 65). When this relation 
can be identified as attitudinal rather than strictly semantic, Stubbs uses the term 
discourse prosody. Discourses can thus be labelled positive, negative or any other 
evaluative label. For example, Baker and McEnery (2005) argue that persistent 
linking of the word asylum seeker to a set of negatively charged concepts will lead 
to the activation of those negative concepts every time we hear or read the word 
asylum seeker (p. 218). 
In Langacker’s (1987) terminology, frames are known as domains, and the 
exact content of such domains varies depending on level of complexity (pp. 
147ff). Langacker uses the term centrality and centrality factors to discuss the 
degree to which encyclopaedic knowledge can be said to have an impact on 
meaning, or perhaps rather to what degree we should pay attention to 
encyclopaedic aspects of meaning (pp. 158-161). A concept may be associated 
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with an infinite set of pieces of information, some of which may be highly 
ideographic or contingent, to use Langacker’s wording, while other pieces of 
information are essential to a concept’s meaning. Langacker argues that for 
encyclopaedic knowledge to be considered an essential component of a concept, it 
has to be conventional, generic, intrinsic and characteristic (p. 159). The notion of 
centrality factors, which is closely related to what is known in ontology as 
essentialism, is incompatible with most post-modern forms of discourse analysis. 
Discourse analysts tend to take the ideographic, or text-specific, into consideration 
just as much as the nomothetic, or what is universal and potentially suitable for 
generalizations. Langacker argues for his essentialist approach to 
conceptualization using the word banana. Langacker says that his sister has slices 
of banana for breakfast (ideographic knowledge), but that this knowledge is not 
important enough to be a part of a wider conceptual frame, according to which the 
fruit is classified based on other properties such as shape or colour (which are 
apparently considered objective enough for generalizations). In discourse analysis, 
on the other hand, the existence of the knowledge of the sister and her nutritional 
habits could hypothetically be of enormous importance (the decision not to eat 
banana could, for example, be interpreted as a stance against globalization or 
unfair working conditions). One of the objects of discourse analysis is to 
foreground, or demystify
5
, what actors choose to background, and to question 
what is foregrounded. It is up to the analyst to decide which aspects should be 
lifted. 
The essentialist influence on the study of fascist discourse is too reductive. In 
his historiography of fascism, historian Linehan (2000) says that contemporary 
research on fascism is dominated by a generic approach which seeks to explain 
fascism in terms of core features (pp. 4f). A definition of fascism suggested by 
Griffin (1991), according to whom fascism can be summed up as a “palingenetic 
form of populist ultra-nationalism”6, has had a large impact on the study of 
fascism (p. 26). Similarly, Payne (1995) sees a generic working definition of 
fascism as a prerequisite for comparative studies, even if the definition turns out 
to be an ideal type that does not necessarily crystallize itself in the real world (p. 
4). The purpose of such a synthesis is to replace what Griffin (1998) describes as a 
checklist approach (pp. 9f). As Griffin (1991) points out, this type of definition is 
a heuristic tool (p. 11), but if used as a truly rigid minimal law, which is easy to 
do when you have simple tools at hand, this might lead to an insufficient amount 
of attention being directed to aspects that are not explicitly accounted for in the 
minimalist definition. It is indeed a problem if scholars’ fixation on certain 
                                                 
5
 As this is a lexical study, emphasis is on foregrounding rather than demystification, which is a 
term used by Fairclough (1992) to refer to the process of clarifying agency, for example by 
studying passive sentences and nominalization. 
6
 Griffin’s (1991) definition of fascism foregrounds the belief in a “political myth” which 
emphasizes national rebirth and regeneration (palingenesis). This palingenetic myth is the party’s 
mobilizing force (p. 27). Populist is a term applied to a cadre whose power is given and 
legitimized by the people (pp. 36f). The difference between nationalism and ultranationalism 
partly corresponds to the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. Nationalists have a 
rational and functional conception of the nation based on citizenship. Ultranationalists share an 
organic conception of the nation and inclusion is based on ethnicity rather than citizenship 
(Griffin, 2006, pp. 451f). 
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aspects allows contemporary (far-right) organizations to revive other old (fascist) 
ideas without being noticed. However, as we will see in the next chapter, broad 
contextualization is a vital part of my approach, and generic definitions can be 
used in order to grasp certain forms of socio-historical embeddings. 
2.1.2 The Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis 
The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is a tradition within the wider 
movement of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA is an interdisciplinary 
approach which combines social theory with linguistic methods, described by 
Fairclough (1992) as an attempt to “marry a method of linguistic text analysis 
with a social theory of the functioning of language in political and ideological 
processes” (p. 26). Elaborating more on the central pillars, Baker et al. (2008) 
describe CDA as “a way of doing discourse analysis from a critical perspective, 
which often focuses on theoretical concepts such as power, ideology and 
domination” (p. 273). CDA is theoretically and methodologically flexible, or as 
van Dijk (2001) puts it, “it does not have a unitary theoretical framework” (p. 
353). In my view, the absence of a predetermined modus operandi is the strength 
of CDA as it allows, or perhaps forces, the researcher to rely on her or his 
knowledge of the field in order to structure the study. 
The Discourse-Historical Approach is a way of applying CDA to the study of 
political discourse, having been described by Wodak (2009) as a “vehicle for 
looking at latent power dynamics and the range of potential agents” (p. 38). The 
relationship between language and power is at the centre, and language is seen as 
the means by which power relations are established and maintained (Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2009, p. 88). Just like CDA, DHA is flexible and allows the analyst to use 
her or his knowledge in order to explain phenomena through contextualization. 
The name, the Discourse-Historical Approach, is a little misleading, however, as 
research within this framework is to a large extent (text) linguistic and social and 
not history per se. What makes DHA unique is its emphasis on interdisciplinary 
contextualization of language. The purpose of DHA is not to offer a linguistic and 
historical description of language (e.g. syntax + etymology), but to use history as 
a means of contextualizing language in time and space, yielding a greater 
understanding of both language and society. Later in this chapter I will introduce 
the term historization as a contextualizing mechanism. 
Key sociologic and political concepts in DHA are critique, ideology and 
power. These are accompanied by the linguistic concepts discourse, text, 
intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualization. My use of DHA follows 
Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001; 2009) and Wodak’s (2001) outline, but diverges 
particularly in terms of quantitative methodology, textual unit of study and 
heuristic levels. The incorporation of corpus linguistics entails a stronger focus on 
lexical items as the main objects of investigation, and my interest in 
neurocognitive aspects of language has resulted in the addition of a 
neurocognitive level to Wodak’s (2001) model of theories and linguistic analysis 
(p. 69). 
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Reisigl and Wodak (2009) define discourse by using a set of abstracted, 
organizational criteria (p. 89). Functionally, discourse is normative arguments; 
formally it is a “cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices” that can be 
assigned a macro-topic. Ontologically, discourse is socially constituted but also 
socially constitutive. In this respect, DHA differs from traditional Marxist 
approaches which see discourse as the manifestation of underlying economic 
function, or post-structuralist approaches such as Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) 
Discourse Theory, where “every object is constituted as an object of discourse” 
(p. 107). Discourse is contrasted with text, which is simply a “specific and unique 
realization of a discourse” (Wodak, 2009, p. 40). 
Critique is a pivotal concept in DHA. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) identify three 
aspects (pp. 32ff). 
 
1. Text or discourse-immanent critique; 
2. Socio-diagnostic critique; 
3. Prospective critique7 
 
First, a researcher should find potential self-contradictions and inconsistencies 
in the texts and discourses. Such inconsistencies are relatively apolitical and 
include logical fallacies. Second, a researcher should expose the persuasive, 
populist and manipulative nature of discursive practices, and identify what she or 
he sees as problematic consequences, should the discourse crystallize as 
implemented policies. This level is not entirely text-internal but involves the use 
of social theories, chosen based on the researcher’s background and contextual 
knowledge. The third step is not concerned with the actual text under 
investigation but rather with the improvement of future communication, e.g. in the 
form of seminars after the research product has been published. 
Context is a pivotal concept in DHA and can be approached from an 
interdiscursive or intertextual angle. Interdiscursivity concerns the embedding of 
discourse topics. For example, discourse on climate change is rarely ever strictly 
meteorological but intertwined with discourses on finance and health (Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2009, p. 90). Intertextuality concerns the linkage of texts to other texts, 
and is a concept central to my study. Blommaert (2005) says that the purpose of 
DHA is to “[trace] the (intertextual) history of phrases and arguments” (p. 28). 
Intertextual should be highlighted rather than put in brackets, as Blommaert does, 
otherwise it would result in rather one-dimensional investigations; it is in fact 
impossible to study conceptual history by looking at one text alone. 
Recontextualization is a more abstract form of intertextuality that is not only 
concerned with explicit references to discourse topics, names or specific events 
but with the history of the relationship between discourse function and form. I 
choose to define recontextualization as formal or functional modification of 
referencing. Formal referencing concerns the implantation of a semiotic form in a 
new context where it is given a new function. This is the type of 
recontextualization process that van Ginderachter (2005) comes across in his 
                                                 
7
 Corresponds to prognostic critique in Wodak (2001, p. 65). 
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investigation of the interwar, fascist Flemish organization Katholieke Vlaamsche 
Meisjesbeweging’s motto Ik dien (’I serve’). van Ginderachter argues that men 
would assume the implicit recipient of women’s services to be either the husband 
or God, while women in fact considered themselves to serve their country (pp. 
274f). Functional referencing occurs when a function or concept is used with a 
different or modified word form(s), e.g. the choice to talk about them rather the 
out-group or the others. This phenomenon is further discussed in 2.2. 
Figure 2 is a visual representation of my adaptation of DHA. My model is 
largely based on Wodak’s (2001, p. 69), however, there are a few differences. My 
approach consists of five heuristic levels rather than four: texts, discourse, specific 
frame, social embeddedness and brain structures and functions. The five levels are 
different ontological sizes, ranging from micro to macro level. The first two levels 
are mediated by intertextuality and interdiscursivity and are purely descriptive. 
The remaining levels are attempts to functionally explain the forms of the first 
two levels using various theories and framing and restriction mechanisms. This is 
in line with received CDA methodology as a “CDA study engages in two major 
aspects of analysis: a descriptive analysis which analyses the texts and accounts 
for linguistic characteristics of the data, and an explanatory level where the 
findings of the first level are contextualized and explained, drawing on linguistic 
and social theories” (KhosraviNik, 2010a, p. 55). 
 
Figure 2. Levels of theories and context, abstraction of methodology and reality levels. 
 
Note. Based on Wodak’s model of context (2001, p. 69). 
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Figure 2 contains three vertical axes: methodology, ontology and 
epistemology. At the centre of Figure 2 we find the ontological dimensions, or 
heuristic levels as they will be referred to here. These heuristic levels illustrate the 
different components of the analysis. It should be stressed that Figure 2 is a 
model, i.e. it contains the aspects that I investigate, but the actual analysis does 
not necessarily run in a strictly linear fashion. As pointed out by Wodak (2001), 
constant movement between the levels is needed (p. 70). I am now going to 
describe these five heuristic levels more in detail. 
The first heuristic level is a pre-discourse level, concerned with texts in 
isolation rather than as a discursive aggregate. The first heuristic level is purely 
descriptive, and Reisigl and Wodak (2009) suggest five “discursive strategies” 
that can be used on this level to analyze group formation (pp. 93f). 
 
 Nomination: what word forms are used in order to represent persons, 
objects, phenomena, processes and actions? 
 Predication: what qualities are attributed to the above forms? 
 Argumentation: how are nomination and predication justified? 
 Perspectivization: how are actors or organizations involved in the use of 
these strategies? 
 Intensification/mitigation: how strong or weak are the linguistic 
realizations of the preceding strategies? 
 
Perspectivization is the red thread throughout this study and here I would like 
to stress its primacy. I claim that we need to make a distinction between 
perspectivization as merely one discursive strategy among many and 
perspectivization as the deep function underpinning discourse. Reisigl and Wodak 
(2009) list a number of linguistic devices affected by this strategy, e.g. deictic 
forms, quotation marks, direct or indirect speech and metaphor (p. 94). However, 
I argue that all the discursive strategies listed above fall within the scope of 
perspectivization. I have created the following example to illustrate how a 
stereotypical construction of Jewish identity can look like. 
 
Nomination: Jews (membership category) 
Predication: Greedy (stereotypical attribute) 
Argument: “They control the economy” 
Perspectivization: A conspiracy (the speaker excludes her/himself) 
Intensification: “They’re everywhere” (hyperbole) 
 
These strategies serve the purpose of constructing an out-group that is 
different from the in-group, or at the very least to distinguish between a group of 
people and the speaker. What is clear is that all constitutive elements are based on 
perspective. This claim is supported by KhosraviNik (2010a) who describes 
perspectivization as an “omnipresent feature of any linguistic realization” since 
“all linguistic products are perspectivized as they are essentially choices and can 
extend from choosing (or not) a certain word to a macro-topic” (p. 58). 
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Nomination and predication correspond to the research questions posed in 1.3 
and will be the main focal points of the analysis. It is, however, impossible to treat 
these two dimensions in isolation from the other three, which I will only touch 
upon peripherally throughout the analysis. I investigate nomination in the in-
group by comparing the BNP’s and UKIP’s choice of form of self-reference. In 
the out-group analysis I look at the parties’ “immigration nomenclature”, i.e. the 
word forms referring to immigrants. Predication is operationalized by looking at 
what qualities the parties claim as unique and what qualities they attribute to 
immigrants. 
I do not intend to analyze intensification/mitigation here, so this strategy is 
only discussed when corpus searches result in findings that need to be addressed 
from that particular perspective. 
Finally, arguments can only be counted if they exist, which is not always the 
case. For example, the parties’ use of party name over pronoun is never 
accompanied by an explanation, while other word forms such as immigration or 
the Third World are often discussed in relation to topoi
8
 such as disease, economy 
or repatriation. Moreover, there are clear limitations to corpus linguistics when it 
comes to identifying arguments, metaphor, discourse topics, et cetera as they 
cannot be identified using simple search words or automatic annotation. 
Hopefully, progress in the field of semantic and pragmatic tagging will change 
this. 
The second heuristic level, the discourse level, is concerned with the formation 
of discourses through intertextuality and embedding of discourse topics through 
interdiscursivity. A study of intertextuality and interdiscursivity involves a body 
of texts produced by one actor alone
9
, which could be a person or an organization. 
The inductive reconstruction of a discourse or discourse topic (a macro-variety) 
from smaller elements is a prerequisite for a comparative analysis. It can of course 
be difficult to relate a macro topic to a discourse, which is one of Reisigl and 
Wodak’s (2009) definitions of discourse (p. 89). This problem is related to the 
question of interdiscursivity and whether a discourse topic can exist in isolation or 
whether embedding is unavoidable. As Baker (2006) explains, “[w]here I see a 
discourse, you may see a different discourse, or no discourse” (p. 4). In chapter 5 I 
reconstruct the discourse topic of immigration. It is of course not unproblematic to 
reconstruct a discourse topic, but by using a corpus-based approach and by using 
relevant search terms, it is easier to reconstruct a discourse topic such as economic 
discourse, environmental discourse or immigration discourse than it is to 
conclude that a discourse is racist, sexist or unfair. In order to make such claims 
                                                 
8
 My use of topos (pl. topoi) diverges somewhat from how it is typically used in DHA (see Baker 
et al., 2008, p. 299). In this study, a topic is a macro label given to discourses (e.g. economic 
discourse, immigration discourse) while a topos refers to the subject matter discussed within a 
discourse. When I discuss meta-aspects of topoi, e.g. the reason d’être of a metaphor, I use the 
term function. 
9
 The reason for this is quite obvious; it is not possible to compare the language of two actors if the 
corpus contains texts produced by many actors. However, interdiscursivity and intertextuality can 
be studied as more general, multi-actor phenomena, for example by studying what texts or slogans 
are frequently cited and used by right-wing organizations (intertextuality) or what discourse topics 
these organizations often discuss (interdiscursivity). These are wider, contextualizing approaches 
and therefore part of the fourth heuristic level. 
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(which I will not make here) you need a priori definitions of what constitutes 
racist, sexist or unfair discourse, similar to van Dijk’s (1987) prejudice schema 
used in his investigation of racist discourse (see 1.2). 
The third heuristic level, the specific frame, corresponds to Wodak’s (2001, 
pp. 67, 69) ‘middle range theories’. Social should not be understood as strictly 
sociological, but may as well incorporate linguistic elements. The choice of theory 
depends on the form that needs explaining, but what the theories have in common 
is that they are specific and operational, i.e. they focus on a particular 
actor/organization and offer explanations to that actor’s or organization’s acts. 
Aspects that can be investigated include amongst other things the structure of an 
organization, the people associated with that organization and the history of the 
organization. The choice of theory, as has already been pointed out, is completely 
dependent on the act that needs investigating. For example, in a study of party 
behaviour, theories deployed can be concerned with ideology, electoral gains or 
branding. 
The fourth heuristic level, here called social embeddedness, contains broader 
theories and corresponds to Wodak’s ‘grand theories’. This level, described by 
Richardson (2013) as “’history’ as it is conventionally understood ‒ the broad and 
complex interactions of people, organizations, institutions and ideas” (p. 183), is 
less operational than the middle range theories found on the third heuristic level. 
Rather than being operational, they constitute a framing foundation. The fourth 
heuristic level can also be understood as similar to conceptual history or 
conceptual semantics. Embeddedness is achieved through a process that I call 
historization. The idea is that a discursive event is not insular but embedded 
politically and socially, and that history is the best way of understanding this 
embeddedness. Historization is a contextualizing process whereby a semiotic 
target feature and its associated actors and organizations are connected to other 
features and actors. The purpose is to identify instances of recontextualization, 
which, if they are cases of functional recontextualization, are found using an 
onomasiological approach. In lexical semantics, onomasiology is the branch 
which seeks to answer the question “How can X be expressed?” (Geeraerts. 2010, 
p. 23). Once a discursive function is discovered, e.g. the desire to associate the 
word form asylum seeker with the concept of criminality, the task is to identify 
similar functions in other synchronic or diachronic actors’ discourses. Since this is 
a comparative study, this sort of identification is achieved by comparing the BNP 
and UKIP, but at this stage it is also important to view the two parties within a 
wider frame, e.g. by comparing with the conceptualizations of immigration found 
in newspaper texts or in the discourses of diachronic actors and organizations. 
The fifth heuristic level is not explicitly dealt with in the analysis. The 
function of a form cannot be explained by social theories alone. It is important to 
remember that there are neural and cognitive constraints on language. Therefore, 
neurocognitive theories are just as important when it comes to explaining the use 
of specific word forms. For example, the intertwining of the word forms asylum 
seeker and refugee, which is discussed in 5.2, cannot only be explained by 
theories about the purpose of intricate bureaucratic terminology, but requires 
amongst other things theories about lexical storage, retrieval and priming (see 
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previous subsection). I therefore find it sound to bear in mind that discourse can 
be explained also by neurocognitive theory. In the present study, frame theory is 
adopted for this purpose, however, neural aspects will not be considered here. It 
should be stressed that the heuristic levels in Figure 2 are merely components of 
this study and not watertight bulkheads. Cognitive aspects are considered at all 
levels, and might arguably be difficult to treat as a demarcated level. The brain 
structure/function level simply serves to point out that there are extra-social 
circumstances affecting language production and consequently discourse, e.g. 
mental illness or damage to the brain caused by a stroke. 
Figure 2 contains a methodological and epistemological axis as well. 
Methodological tools will be further discussed in 2.3. The levels of reality, 
originally developed by Lundquist (2007) as a part of a wider definition of 
ontology encompassing size, actor position and reality levels, is used here to 
illustrate the limited range of objectivity and to illustrate which levels different 
methods and contexts seek to describe. The statement level, which contains an 
actor’s contended motivation, can be objectively described. The information level 
contains an actor’s perceived motivation, and how exactly to reach that 
information is a difficult question to answer. One way would be to deductively 
infer discursive implications from a hypothetical motivation and then ascertain 
whether these implications occur on the statement level. Identification of self-
contradictions on the text level would be another indication that there is a 
discrepancy between what an actor says and thinks. The reality level is more 
difficult to reach and is therefore not dealt with here. It should, however, be 
stressed that any inference drawn from corpus material is concerned with the 
statement level rather than the reality level, i.e. any discussion of “true motives” 
or “real identity” are impossible. This might be particularly true in the case of the 
BNP; Richardson (2011) asserts that there is always a difference between what 
parties such as the BNP say, and what they really believe (p. 38). An analyst could 
for example decide to investigate the validity of all statements in a corpus; to 
ascertain to what degree politicians lie or tell the truth. However, I find this 
unnecessary. The occurrence of a discourse says a lot, whether the facts are 
correct or wrong. 
2.2 Analytical perspectives 
The parties’ use of language is approached from two different perspectives: the 
creation of the in-group, i.e. the parties themselves, and the creation of the out-
group, i.e. immigrants. In-group and out-group are an analytical dichotomy with a 
long and theoretically rich history, originating in the fields of sociology and 
psychology. Writing in 1921, sociologists Burgess and Park defined this 
dichotomy, which is used interchangeably with the terms we-group and others-
group, in the following manner. 
 
Thus a differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and 
everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a 
relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation 
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to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as 
agreements have modified it. If a group is exogamic, the women in it were born 
abroad somewhere. Other foreigners who might be found in it are adopted persons, 
guest-friends, and slaves. 
(Burgess and Park, 1921, p. 294) 
 
The notion of conflict as a deterministic phenomenon and the emphasis on 
race that was common in pre-Holocaust social science have, hopefully, 
disappeared by now. Instead, other aspects of group formation have been 
emphasized, e.g. the concept of sameness (Cillia et al., 2009, pp. 11ff). In their 
analysis of an Austrian informant’s view of national identity, Cillia et al. highlight 
aspects such as a common culture, a common history, a common (small) territory 
and a common language as the glue that holds an in-group together (p. 119). 
Eighty-four years after the publication of Burgess and Park’s Introduction to 
the Science of Sociology, the following statement was made in the BNP 
Languages & Concepts Discipline Manual, underlining the fact that there can be 
no mixing of in-groups and out-groups. 
 
BNP activists and writers should never refer to ‘black Britons’ or ‘Asian Britons’ 
etc, for the simple reason that such persons do not exist. These people are ‘black 
residents’ of the UK etc, and are no more British than an Englishman living in Hong 
Kong is Chinese. Collectively, foreign residents of other races should be referred to 
as ‘racial foreigners’, a non-pejorative term that makes clear the distinction needing 
to be drawn. The key in such matters is above all to maintain necessary distinctions 
while avoiding provocation and insult. (Original emphasis) 
 
Formally different from Burgess and Park’s definition but functionally the 
same, Spencer (1892) distinguished between a code of amity and a code of enmity 
(p. 136); a dichotomy that anthropologist Keith (1948) would use even after the 
Second World War to describe racial characteristics of Jews
10
 (pp. 390f). For 
political theorist Mouffe (2000), polarity is a necessity in a truly democratic 
society. More conflicting discourses prevent the blurring of traditional political 
distinctions (p. 96), without which there will be an increase in nationalist 
sentiment and support for the extreme right and other sectarian forms of collective 
self-identification (pp. 80, 114). Thus the presence of a ‘them’ to counterbalance 
‘us’, is an absolute prerequisite for a sustainable democratic climate, but a 
distinction has to be made between antagonism and agonism. The purpose of that 
distinction is to “provid[e] channels through which collective passions will be 
given ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough 
possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as 
an adversary” (p. 103). 
I employ the in-group-out-group dichotomy for practical reasons. The in-
groups in this investigation are the BNP and UKIP respectively, and the out-
groups are all those who are explicitly identified by either party as not being a 
member of the in-group. Given the esoteric nature of the parties, the list of out-
                                                 
10
 Keith uses the term circle rather than group. 
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groups is potentially infinite. It is interesting to note the dual applicability of the 
dichotomy. In the hands of a nationalist party, in-groups and out-groups 
correspond to us vs. them. In the hands of a researcher, it is rather supposed to be 
a distinction between two different they. DHA is not an objective approach, 
however, but seeks to deliver critique emanating from the researcher, and if 
possible, to offer prospective critique. UKIP, which in many ways resembles the 
BNP but also diverges in several aspects, is currently gaining momentum while 
the BNP is slowly pushed into the shadows again. The reader may therefore want 
to see this thesis as an attempt to identify the similarities between the two parties, 
and then decide for her or himself whether these similarities are of importance. 
Silverman (2006) discusses the ethical questions which arise when researchers 
interact or study groups of people with which we would perhaps not otherwise 
interact, or “fraternizing with groups we dislike”, to use Silverman’s words (p. 
321). It is, for example, suggested that interaction with such groups is a way of 
transcending the us-them dichotomy; a dichotomy that perhaps does more damage 
than good in social research, and which might halt social change (pp. 321f). In 
The Fascists in Britain, one of the earliest comprehensive accounts of British 
fascism, historian Cross (1961) states his own political position: “My approach to 
the subject has been in a spirit of pure inquiry and I have tried to ignore my 
personal views, which are anti-Fascist and unsympathetic to anti-Semitism or 
racialism” (p. 7). Richardson and Wodak (2013) note that David Renton and 
Roger Griffin, two of the contemporary historians who have had the most 
influence on the study of fascism, hold disparate positions when it comes to the 
issue of neutrality, with Renton dispensing with the notion altogether and Griffin 
arguing that fascism should be treated just like any other ideology (p. 6). 
Contemporary studies of the British or Swedish context of far-right extremism 
cannot be said to be objective, signalled by the use of the term fascist by scholars 
such as Copsey (2008) or Goodwin (2011). Even more subjective stances are 
taken by journalists. In his account of the National Front, the forerunner of the 
BNP, Walker (1977) writes that he “oppose[s] the National Front, the ideology 
they stand for, the policies they present and the poison they inject”. Another 
example of a subjective stance can be found in Blomquist and Bjurwald’s (2009) 
investigation of women in the Swedish far-right, women whom they refer to as 
‘Nazi chicks’ (Swe. nassebrudar) (p. 21). 
I share Cross’ views on fascism, anti-Semitism and racism, however, I am not 
sure that he can speak for both of us when it comes to the question of objectivity. 
It is an inevitable fact that all research is subjective in one way or another. The 
best way of compensating for researcher bias is to do what I do here; to let the 
material, in my case a corpus, talk for itself. As Baker (2006) argues, the 
consultation of a corpus makes it possible to “place a number of restrictions on 
our cognitive biases”, i.e. with a large data set at your disposal it is difficult to 
justify why you should use only a small selected body of texts (cherry-picking) (p. 
12). This is not an unproblematic approach either, though. As already stated, DHA 
(and CDA) is not an objective approach; Baker (2012) goes as far as to conclude 
that for CDA analysts, the “explicit position” is a “strength rather than a problem” 
(p. 255). However, he also concludes that it is important to apply scientific 
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methodology, e.g. data-driven and statistical approaches, and to avoid polemics. 
In a self-critical evaluation of his own previous study of representations of Islam 
in British newspapers (Baker, 2010a), Baker (2012) reaches the conclusion that 
any statement a discourse analyst makes about language use can be construed and 
criticized in a great many ways even if the argument is backed up by corpus data 
and is not the result of cherry-picking. His statement that British media is biased 
against Muslims can be supported by corpus findings that show that the words 
Muslim(s) are linked to extremist words in so-and-so many instances, but then the 
question arises how many percentages are required in order to justify such a 
statement. To complicate the matter even further, there are undoubtedly people 
who believe that Muslims should not be assigned extremist labels at all and for 
whom one single instance of such attribution would suffice to make statements 
about media bias. Conversely, some people would claim that there are not enough 
negative descriptions of Muslims, and would thus reject the notion of media bias 
(pp. 252-255). 
2.2.1 The in-group perspective 
This is a description of how I will investigate how the BNP and UKIP use the 
discursive strategies nomination and predication to create an in-group. The 
investigation of nomination focuses on the word forms used by the parties to 
communicate with potential voters. I will use the following search terms: 
 
 We 
 BNP, British National Party, UKIP, UK Independence Party, United 
Kingdom Independence Party 
 
The search terms constitute a dichotomy consisting of pronoun and party 
name. Naturally, the parties also use other features and constructions when 
addressing readers. My choice of search terms is motivated by a study by Edwards 
(2012) in which he focuses on the choice between we and party name as preferred 
form of self-reference in the BNP’s 2005 and 2010 general election manifestos. 
Not only do I have the possibility to test his findings on a much bigger data set, 
but I can also make a cross-party comparison. 
The aim of the investigation of the predicational strategy is to ascertain what 
qualities the parties believe they possess or do not possess and in what political 
areas the parties claim to have unique competence, i.e. what image they project. I 
operationalize this by searching for instances in which the adverb only occurs 
within 50 spaces to the left and right of a party name, and then clean the 
concordance lines. An example can be seen in (1). 
 
(1) Only UKIP are committed to restoring weekly bin collections. 
 
Again, there are other ways to express uniqueness and to attribute qualities. 
The semantics of only is one reason for selecting it, however, the choice was 
ultimately based on a smaller pilot study carried out manually on an arbitrarily 
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selected BNP construction file (i.e. the files in which the texts were stored before 
they were compiled and eventually tagged) consisting of around 35,000 words. 
Other ways of expressing uniqueness were found, e.g. 
 
(2) No other party stands up for those who cannot speak for themselves. 
(3) [W]e know how to restore order and respect to our society but no one in 
the political establishment has the balls to do it! We do. 
 
These constructions were, however, few in comparison to the use of the only-
construction. Moreover, constructions such as (2) and (3) are difficult to search 
for, in comparison with the more easily searchable only. Finally, as negation of 
possessing certain qualities is as important as claiming to have them, I also use the 
search string /[party name] is|are not/ to find sentences such as (4). 
 
(4) UKIP is not antiimmigrant, racist or xenophobic. 
2.2.2 The out-group perspective 
Just like the analysis of in-groups, the out-group analysis is concerned with the 
use of nominational and predicational strategies. The choice of analytical starting 
point is not an obvious one though. While the application of the term in-group is 
limited to the BNP and UKIP themselves, the out-group is potentially infinite, and 
far from homogenous in any way. 
I have chosen to focus on how the parties construct their immigration 
discourses, particularly the aspects of immigration terminology, quantification and 
origin. Immigration is a vague concept, which is precisely why it makes such an 
excellent topic for investigation. Unlike discourses on more demarcated groups, 
e.g. Muslims or Europeans, which might seem the most obvious starting points 
given the BNP’s and UKIP’s strong focus on Islam and the EU respectively, an 
“immigration discourse” can encompass so many more aspects. A European must 
come from or live in Europe by definition, and a Muslim must, also by definition, 
adhere to the teachings of Islam. There are no such restrictions on the construction 
of immigration and immigrants. 
In order to make a comparison between the two parties I inductively 
reconstruct the immigration discourse topic using corpus linguistic tools. The 
word pairing below serves as a springboard for the analysis and helps me identify 
the qualities that the BNP and UKIP attribute to immigrants: 
 
 Immigration 
 Immigrant(s) 
 
For the investigation of nomination, or immigration terminology, I use the 
search words listed below: 
 
 Asylum seeker(s) 
 Immigrant(s) 
 24 
 Refugee(s) 
 
Obviously, there are other ways in which you can refer to immigrants. These 
search terms have been used in corpus studies carried out on British newspaper 
texts (Baker and McEnery, 2005; Baker et al., 2008; KhosraviNik, 2010b), and it 
is therefore my hope that this study will make it possible to compare the 
construction of immigrants as an out-group in far-right discourse with the same 
process in the media. 
During my investigation of quantification I found that water metaphors occur 
quite frequently with immigrants. The water metaphor wave of (immigrants) has 
been the topic of several studies, e.g. Refaie, 2001; Baker and McEnery (2005) 
and Charteris Black (2006). However, while Charteris-Black (2006) carried out an 
analysis of water metaphors in the BNP’s 2005 general election manifesto, Baker 
and McEnery used two larger corpora consisting of newspaper and United 
Nations texts. Thus neither has carried out a similar investigation on a large BNP 
or UKIP data set. With the aid of a larger corpus, I can undertake a more 
quantitative investigation of these political phenomena. 
Origin is another aspect frequently discussed by both parties. In order to 
ascertain whether the parties’ emphasis on the EU and Islam respectively entails 
frequent attribution of national origin to immigrants, I undertake a qualitative and 
a quantitative analysis. For the qualitative analysis I identify references to 
geographical words (countries, continents, parts of continents) occurring with the 
words immigration and immigrant(s). The quantitative analysis is a large-scale 
frequency analysis and the search terms are the names of countries and national 
adjectives. This method and the other corpus methods I use are described in the 
next section. 
2.3 Analytical tools 
Here I describe the general use of frequency, dispersion plots, collocational 
analysis and concordance. I also state universal parameters of data collection and 
presentation. The software used for this study is Anthony Laurence’s Antconc, 
which contains all the traditional corpus linguistic tools described here, and 
more.
11
 
In order to bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative methodology in 
the social sciences, I do corpus analyses. Baker et al. (2008) have highlighted the 
fuzziness of the boundaries between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and 
points out that by using simple quantitative methods, “’qualitative’ findings can 
be quantified, and that ‘quantitative’ findings need to be interpreted in the light of 
existing theories, and lead to their adaptation, or the formulation of new ones” (p. 
296). 
Tognini-Bonelli (2001) has suggested a distinction between corpus-based and 
corpus-driven analyses (pp. 65, 74). In a corpus-based study, the corpus serves to 
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 The software is freely available at Anthony Laurence’s website http://www.antlab.sci.waseda. 
ac.jp/index.html. 
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provide evidence for pre-corpus hypotheses. In a corpus-driven study on the other 
hand the corpus should be approached without any preconceptions, typically by 
using word lists or keyword lists rather than search terms as analytical starting 
points. In reality, corpus methodology is not as polarized as Tognini-Bonelli 
suggests; it is rather more like a continuum. My approach is found somewhere in 
the middle of this continuum. It is partly corpus-based since I use subjectively 
generated search terms (e.g. immigrant, refugee) as analytical starting points 
rather than using objective word lists (keyness), and it is partly corpus-driven in 
the sense that my findings, whatever they may be, are the motivation for further 
analysis. The continuum view is shared by McEnery and Gabrielatos (2006, p. 
36). 
 
As far as the role of theory in corpus linguistic research is concerned, it is more 
helpful to regard different approaches as falling between two end-points of a 
continuum, rather than belonging to one of two polar extremes. At one end, the 
corpus is used to find evidence for or against a given theory, or one or more 
theoretical frameworks are taken for granted; at the other, the observed patterns in 
the corpus data are used as a basis from which to derive insights about language, 
independent of pre-existing theories and frameworks, with a view to developing a 
purely empirical theory. 
 
What is important to underline is that this is a usage-based approach, meaning 
that the corpus is the empirical data in which habitual linguistic patterns can be 
found. In practice, this means that the investigation of one feature might require 
the investigation of another feature, i.e. the analysis of one search term generates a 
new search term. In accordance with DHA methodology, I move recursively 
between theory and empirical material in the analysis. This also means that not 
every tool is used for every search word. As pointed out by Reisigl and Wodak 
(2009), “[c]ategories and tools are not fixed once and for all. They must be 
elaborated for each analysis according to the specific problem under 
investigation” (p. 95). 
2.3.1 Frequency and dispersion analysis 
Frequency is the most basic method used in this thesis. If a corpus query is 
motivated and well thought-out, a frequency list can be used in order to identify a 
discourse, because, as pointed out by Baker (2006), “if people […] make one 
linguistic choice over another, more obvious one, then that reveals something 
about their intentions, whether conscious or not” (p. 48). Frequency analysis is 
mainly used in order to identify common forms of nomination, as in 4.1 where it 
is used in order to compare the most prevalent linguistic forms of self-
representation. In 5.2 it is used in order to calculate the distribution of the 
nominational forms asylum seeker(s), immigrant(s) and refugee(s). 
Frequency analysis is also carried out on a large-scale level. Large-scale 
frequency analysis is different from my other methods in that it, unlike a 
concordance or collocational analysis, does not generate new search terms. In this 
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study, I use large-scale frequency analysis in 5.4, where I use a regular expression 
accounting for all country names and national adjectives in the world
12
 in order to 
ascertain where the parties claim that immigrants come from. 
Since the texts in the corpus are chronologically ordered, dispersion plots can 
reveal whether a feature occurs consistently throughout the corpus, which would 
suggest that it is a salient feature, or just in a few clusters, which would suggest 
that it is either used in a particular context, by a particular writer or in relation to a 
particular event. Consider the two dispersion plots from the BNP subcorpus in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Dispersion plots of the words halal and violence in the BNP subcorpus. 
 
Dispersion of halal in the BNP subcorpus. 
 
 
Dispersion of violence in the BNP subcorpus. 
 
In the BNP subcorpus, halal is a quite frequent word (55 occurrences) but the 
level of dispersion is low. Another word, violence, occurs 63 times, but has a 
much higher level of dispersion. The inference we can draw here is that, yes, halal 
is an important word for the BNP, but its spread is low, which might hint that the 
word is only used in certain contexts (which it is; a concordance analysis shows 
that the word usually occurs in news stories promoting the party’s anti-halal 
campaign). Dispersion plots are for example employed in chapter 5 in order to 
determine whether the search terms immigration and immigrant(-s) are truly 
occurring consistently in the parties’ language and therefore can be said to be 
salient parts of discourse. 
2.3.2 Collocational analysis 
Lenci et al. (2005) define collocation as a sequence of at least two words signified 
by a mutually strong associative bond, but admit that it is difficult to separate a 
collocate from the rest of the linguistic structure (pp.196f). In Baker’s (2006) 
definition, statistical significance is a constituent part (p. 95f), but the motivation 
clearly springs from an interest in social issues: “An association between two 
words, occurring repetitively in naturally occurring language, is much better 
evidence for an underlying hegemonic discourse which is made explicit through 
the word pairing than a single case” (p. 13). 
Unless otherwise specified, I search for collocates that occur within a span of 
five spaces to the left and right of the search term. Numbers in parentheses 
alongside collocates are, unless otherwise stated, raw frequencies. The lists of 
collocates will only contain lexical items (nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs). I 
have also chosen to omit modal verbs, as the top 10 otherwise would have been 
crammed with various verb forms that, on the one hand could tell us a lot about 
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 Countries, i.e. members of the United Nations (http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml). 
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stance and normativity,
13
 but which do not say much about how the parties 
construct different groups. In chapter 5 I search for collocates of immigration to 
get a first image of how the immigration discourse can be framed. The structure of 
the chapter is a direct result of these collocates. Generally in chapter 5, 
collocational analysis is used in order to investigate forms of predication. 
2.3.3 Concordance analysis 
Concordance, a list of the many micro-contexts of a search term, is the most 
important tool I use in this paper. A simple search term generates a number of 
concordance lines in which the search term is located at the centre. Lexical and 
discursive patterns are identified by browsing through and sorting concordance 
lines. 
 
Figure 4. A screenshot of the concordance function in AntConc. 
 
 
Note. This example contains instances of the lexeme BAN occurring within 50 spaces of 
burka/burqa in the UKIP subcorpus. 
 
Before a concordance is analyzed and presented in table form, I clean the list 
by removing repetitions (which might occur since the parties re-use certain 
phrasings) and irrelevant lines (which might occur due to e.g. homonymy).
14
 The 
concordance software is concerned with the number of characters rather than 
words preceding and succeeding the search term, which means that some of the 
lines might contain words that are incomplete in terms of spelling. Unless I can 
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 For example, my own tentative comparisons between the BNP-UKIP corpus and the big 
reference corpora the BNC and COCA (see 3.2) suggest a significant discrepancy in the use of 
weak and strong modal verbs. For example, the modal shall is highly frequent in BNP and UKIP 
texts, even in passive constructions. 
14
 Not more than a handful of lines had to be removed. 
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identify a word with complete confidence, i.e. when no other derivation or 
inflection is possible, I restore the word; otherwise, it is removed from the line. 
In chapter 4.2, I use concordance in order to identify the political areas in 
which the BNP and UKIP claim unique competence. In 5.2 I use concordance to 
look closer at the parties’ use of refugee, in 5.3 it is used in order to identify water 
metaphors and in 5.4 to identify topoi in relation to the Third World. 
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3 Material 
In this chapter I provide an overview of the design and structure of my corpus. I 
also explain my choice and use of reference corpus. 
3.1 The BNP-UKIP corpus 
In order to carry out quantitative research I have compiled a corpus consisting of 
articles and policy documents freely available from official BNP and UKIP 
outputs
15
. Unlike the British National Corpus (BNC) or the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA), which provide samples of general 
British and American English respectively, the purpose of my corpus is to provide 
a standard sample of BNP and UKIP language. However, as politics is dynamic 
and political organizations evolve, the corpus is only representative of the time in 
which it was compiled. This also explains the relatively small size of the corpus. 
With 912,329 words, it belongs to the same size category as the Brown Corpus, a 
corpus of American prose published in 1961 and compiled by Francis and Kučera 
with the aim of offering a standard sample of Present-Day American English 
(Francis and Kučera, 1964). The size of the corpus is completely contingent on 
what amount of text is available to the public, and in this respect the BNP is ahead 
of UKIP with nearly four times as much text available online (my own 
approximation). The number of words in the news articles and policy documents 
sections are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Size of the BNP and UKIP subcorpora and sections. 
 Number of words 
in articles 
Number of words  
in policy documents 
Total number  
of words 
BNP 349,996 
(76.57%) 
107,112 
(23.43%) 
457,108 
UKIP 350,029 
(76.89%) 
105,192 
(23.11%) 
455,221 
   Corpus (total): 912,329 
Note. Section ratios in parentheses. 
 
The data collection is governed by external criteria, according to which the 
corpus is divided into a BNP and a UKIP subcorpus, which account for 50.1 and 
49.9% respectively of the total word count. The subcorpora are in turn divided 
into one section for articles and one for policy documents. These categories 
roughly correspond to the spatial notions of macro and micro varieties, although 
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 All samples are authentic BNP and UKIP texts, freely available at www.bnp.org.uk and 
www.ukip.org respectively. The British National Party Language and Concepts Manual is the 
only text included in the BNP subcorpus that has not been downloaded from the official BNP 
website. This document was leaked by WikiLeaks in 2009 but has since then been publically 
defended by party chairman Nick Griffin (BBC 2009, April 23). 
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they should be viewed as imprecise delimitations rather than a precise pint of 
language. There are indeed articles so short that they could pass as tweets and 
articles so long that they could be placed in another size category. The articles and 
policy sections can also be seen from a temporal perspective, i.e. in terms of the 
degree of preparation that precedes publication. Since most articles in this corpus 
are news stories, it is assumed that they are a less planned form of communication 
than policy documents. The number of texts in each subcorpus and section is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Number of texts and words per text. 
  Number of texts Words per text
16
 
 BNP 641 more than 100, 
less than 3,000 
Articles    
 UKIP 1322 more than 50,  
less than 2,000 
    
 BNP 5 more than 1,900 
less than 33,600 
Policy documents    
 UKIP 12 more than 6,300 
less than 16,200 
 
The articles sections contain 700,025 words and thus constitute the bulk of the 
corpus, accounting for 76.73% of the total number of words. “Articles” are the 
short-to-medium length texts published under the news banner on the parties’ 
respective websites. UKIP articles and policy documents are typically shorter than 
BNP texts. The BNP subcorpus contains 641 articles published between May 
2010
17
 and 29 February 2012. The UKIP subcorpus contains 1,322 articles 
published between 7 March 2007 and 28 June 2012. The obvious discrepancy
18
 
between the subcorpora in terms of number of articles is explained by the textual 
nature of UKIP articles. A typical UKIP article is brief, often only a paragraph, 
while a typical BNP article is considerably longer, and rarely, if ever, shorter than 
a paragraph. Besides the spatial aspect, this entails that the UKIP publication span 
is three years longer than that of the BNP. The BNP is extraordinary in this 
respect; no other political party to the right of the centre-right produces even 
nearly as much material, a fact that unfortunately renders similar quantitative 
                                                 
16
 Articles and policy documents are only stored according to party belonging and genre, i.e. they 
are not stored individually, which is why I can only give approximate lengths for the articles. The 
number of policy documents is much lower and quicker to process, hence the more precise 
numbers. 
17
 It is difficult to pinpoint the exact starting point of the time span due to a lack of dating in older 
BNP articles. However, by tracing individual events reported in the articles, it can be placed 
shortly after the general election on 6 May, 2010. 
18
 This corpus is clearly isolexical, i.e. the purpose is to allow comparisons to be made across 
subcorpora containing a similar amount of words. This is contrasted with isotextual corpora, 
which contain a similar number of texts (Oakey, 2009, p. 141). 
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linguistic research on parties and groups such as the English Democrats or the 
English Defence League impossible (the same is true of many other small parties). 
As seen in Table 3, the articles belong to different “genres”, typically news 
stories, opinion, open letters, obituaries et cetera. The texts thus cover the main 
party strata, both the top layers and the rank and file. 
 
Table 3. Types of genres and policy documents. 
   
 BNP 
and 
UKIP 
News stories, opinion, obituaries, open letters, 
seasonal greetings, recommendations of video 
clips, announcements (of meetings et cetera), 
membership offers. 
Articles 
 
   
 BNP 2005 GE manifesto, 2010 GE manifesto, 
constitution, activists’ guide, language manual. 
Documents   
 UKIP 2010 GE manifesto, constitution, 2011 England 
LE manifesto, policy area manifestos (agriculture; 
Britishness; constitution; defence; education; 
government; immigration; justice; welfare and 
economy). 
Note. GE = general election, LE = local election 
 
The policy section constitutes 23.27% of the corpus and consists mainly of 
manifestos, published between 2005 and 2011. The BNP section includes the 
2005 and 2010 general election manifestos, an activists’ guide and a language 
manual. The UKIP section also contains the 2010 general election manifesto, as 
well as the England 2011 local election manifesto. The bulk of the UKIP section, 
however, consists of policy documents emphasizing specific questions. Both 
sections contain respective party’s constitution. The low policy ratio is due to a 
shortage of material of this kind. This goes for both parties; news reports are 
published almost on a daily basis on both party websites (although, as the 
availability of material shows, a little less frequently on UKIP’s) while more 
extensive manifestos are only published before general elections. In contrast, local 
election manifestos are typically much shorter; e.g. the parties’ 2012 London 
election manifestos (not included here), which only cover a single page. 
Moreover, certain local manifestos could not be included since they are written in 
Welsh or Scottish Gaelic. 
The articles sections constitute nearly 80% of the total number of words, a 
ratio which reflects the parties’ text production quite well. Articles also appear to 
be more representative of a party’s linguistic outflow than policy documents as 
one can assume that they are realizations of a larger number of contributors. 
Policies can be either static (general election manifestos) or progressive (topic-
specific manifestos that are updated rather than replaced), but whatever shape they 
take, they fix the corpus in time to a higher degree than articles do. 
Any inclusion of material raises the question as to what extent it actually 
mirrors the actors’ true motives, and to what extent they are representative of the 
parties as a whole. There is no obvious way of determining whether my choice of 
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samples is representative of the parties I set out to study, simply because so little 
is known about their internal structure. It is not known who publishes articles on 
their websites since few articles are signed, and in the BNP’s case not always 
dated. I have, however, contacted both parties in order to provide a sufficient 
genealogy of the texts included in my corpus and in order to ask party officials 
questions about their view of their party’s language use. It has been difficult to 
arrange interviews since the BNP has a non-student policy. Also UKIP seems 
hesitant to talk to students. The little that I know about the text sources comes 
from personal conversations with the registrant and owner of UKIP’s website, 
former MEP Dr. John Whittaker. Whittaker paints an image of a party that has 
little control over its own organization. He does not know who the current editor-
in-chief is, and adds that “it’s always been such a mess and probably is in most 
organizations”. When I explain to him that I am interested in knowing who writes 
the texts, he simply states that “the party has published the texts. Beyond that, I 
am not sure if you are going to get anywhere. And I am not sure that it is in my 
interest or the party’s interest to help you get any further.” He also says that he 
could contact people and ask them to help me, but then declares that he is not 
going to do that (J. Whittaker, personal communication, 7 November, 2012). I 
have made numerous attempts to obtain demographic data from the BNP, but to 
no avail. 
Because it is possible to comment on articles published on the BNP’s website, 
it might seem suitable to include some of those comments in order for the corpus 
to be representative of more membership strata. Since the UKIP website does not 
provide a commenting service any more and since there are no means of verifying 
that the commentators are even members of the parties, I have chosen not to 
include this micro variety. Micro blogs such as Twitter were considered, but the 
availability of material would have led to an overemphasis on key people such as 
party leaders, councillors and MEPs. It would undoubtedly have been interesting 
to include such material, but doing so would have raised the question as to what 
extent users are speaking as private citizens or as representatives of their party. I 
intended this investigation to be organization-oriented rather than actor-oriented, 
which is in part a forced approach since BNP and UKIP representatives do not 
seem to be using social media to the extent that a quantitative investigation can be 
undertaken. 
The decision was made to include texts in their entirety. To decide upon a 
standard size of sample was never a plausible option as the final data set would 
prove too small. After the data had been captured, the texts were converted from 
their original formats into plain text, thus stripping them of non-textual elements. 
All structural and automatic features such as headers, page numbers and tables of 
contents have been omitted. Moreover, I have taken care to clean up the texts by 
deleting links, email addresses and contact information where these features have 
been clearly separated from the main body of text. Dates of publication and pen 
names (where available) have been left untouched in order to ease identification 
of individual texts. As with any genre, certain wordings and even paragraphs are 
more pervasive than others and may therefore occur in more than one document. 
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In order to perform more specific queries, the corpus has been syntactically 
annotated using Treetagger, a stochastic part-of-speech-tagger using the English 
parameter file trained on the PENN Tree Bank. Like with any POS-tagger 
(software which assigns parts of speech to each word in the corpus), it is hard to 
estimate its accuracy. Rossini Favretti et al. (2002) estimate an error rate of 
9.24%, but it should be pointed out that the training was performed on an Italian 
pilot corpus (p. 36). 
3.2 Reference corpus 
In order to establish the importance of lexical frequency in the BNP-UKIP corpus, 
I use the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) as a reference 
corpus. It contains 450 million words, of which 20 million are replaced annually 
with newer material (Davies, 2010, p. 448). American political vocabulary is 
arguably different from European, however, neither the British National Corpus 
(BNC) nor any other British corpora were considered simply because they are all 
too old.
19
 COCA, in contrast, is one of the largest contemporary corpora of the 
English language currently available. Also, given the BNP’s and UKIP’s interest 
in Muslim affairs, any unmonitored corpus made available before 2002 would 
generate obsolete frequencies. 
                                                 
19
 The BNC, which was completed in 1994, contains material produced in the later part of the 
1900s (BNC). 
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4 The in-group analysis: the parties 
This chapter is concerned with two aspects of in-group construction: self-
reference and image. In 4.1 I investigate the BNP’s and UKIP’s choice of form of 
self-reference and compare these to the parties represented in the House of 
Commons. In 4.2 I study party image. I identify what qualities the parties claim as 
unique (4.2.1), what qualities they do not want to be associated with (4.2.2) and 
finally how the BNP and UKIP perceive each other (4.2.3). 
4.1 Self-reference 
There are currently two
20
 nationalist parties in the House of Commons with non-
unionist names: the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru (‘The Party of 
Wales’) but no party with a name containing the elements Britain/British or UK. 
The BNP and UKIP are not the only nationalist parties operating in England with 
a holistic approach to the UK electorate mirrored in their party name, however. 
Diachronically, a large number of political organizations using Britain or British 
as part of their name can be classified either as fascist or fascist avant la lettre, e.g. 
the British Empire Union, the British Commonwealth Party, the British Fascisti 
(later: the British Fascists), the British Union, the British Union of Fascists, the 
British United Fascists, the British People’s Party (for an overview, see Linehan, 
2000), the Greater Britain Movement and the British Democratic Party (see 
Copsey, 2004). Other contemporary parties include Britain First (founded in 
2011), the British Democratic Party (founded by former BNP MEP Andrew 
Brons in 2013) and the British Freedom Party (founded in 2010 and previously 
led by Paul Weston, a former UKIP politician). 
The BNP is not the first party to use this name. As we saw in 1.1, the first far-
right British National Party was the result of the merging of the White Defence 
League and the National Labour Party in the early 1960s (see Richardson, 2013 
for a historical outline). Also as seen in 1.1, UKIP developed out of the cross-
party organization the Anti-Federalist League (AFL) in 1993. Several political 
forces, both on the left and the right, have adopted the form league as part of their 
name, however, those on the right have been given the most attention recently, 
mainly because of the emergence of the violent English Defence League. Other 
far-right organizations that have adopted league as part of their name include the 
British Workers League (BWL), the Economic League (EL), the Imperial Fascist 
League (IFL) and the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL). Of the organizations 
mentioned in the preceding enumeration, IFL, founded in 1929 by former British 
Fascisti member Arnold Leese, is the only organization that was also a political 
party. The remaining organizations were ginger groups, connected to fascist or 
nationalist parties; BWL to the nationalist National Democratic and Labour Party, 
EL to the anti-Bolshevik British Empire Union and LEL to the Conservatives (see 
                                                 
20
 Perhaps the abstentionist Sinn Féin, whose Irish name means ‘we ourselves’, could be added to 
this list. 
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Linehan, 2000, 44f for a brief description of BWL and EL; see Walker, 1977 for a 
history of LEL). 
There are clear parallels between LEL and UKIP; they both started out as 
“leagues” with Britain as the in-group and those who were perceived as threats to 
Britain’s power as the out-group. In LEL’s case, the objective was to prevent the 
Empire from falling apart; UKIP on the other hand is fighting against what it sees 
as the imminent danger of devolution and federalism. LEL would merge with a 
handful of other parties to form the National Front, the forerunner of the BNP, in 
1967, while the Anti-Federalist League would go from being anti-Maastricht to 
anti-EU. However, the suggestion that UKIP is, or was, a pressure group, is 
strongly denied by former MEP John Whittaker, who says that the objective even 
from the start was to challenge the establishment. As he explains, there have been 
many pressure groups in British history, but they have little to show for their 
efforts. “The only way to make progress is to challenge the other major political 
parties”, he explains (J. Whittaker, personal communication, 30 November, 2012). 
Party names are important, naturally, since they are supposed to say something 
about the party and its representatives. A party name should invoke a feeling of 
moral affinity, i.e. in the same way as a specific issue should activate a moral 
frame (see 2.1.1). Consequently, it should be possible to study the state of a party 
by investigating party name distribution. Edwards (2012) compares the 
distribution of the abbreviation BNP in the BNP 2005 and 2010 general election 
manifestos, and contrasts the numbers with the frequency of self-reference 
pronouns. He finds that the BNP’s use of party name has increased dramatically in 
those five years, from a mere 33 instances (or 0.13%) in 2005 to 372 (or 1.25%) 
in 2010. Conversely, the number of instances in which we functions as self-
reference has decreased from 329 to 236 (p. 248). Edwards does not explain this 
change merely in stylistic terms, but rather argues that the party has undergone a 
profound transformation and that the increase in the use of the abbreviation BNP 
on behalf of we is indicative of growing self-confidence (p. 249). 
The low frequency of party name in the 2005 manifesto is interpreted by 
Edwards as a tactic to legitimize ideas, but legitimization does not necessarily 
entail emulating mainstream political parties. Although Edwards’ comparison 
yields interesting results, it seems a good idea to view both the BNP and UKIP 
within an even bigger frame. Figure 5 contains the ratio of we to party name as 
form of self-reference in the 2010 general election manifestos of all ten parties 
represented in the House of Commons, plus the BNP and UKIP. 
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Figure 5. Ratio of the pronoun we to party name in the 2010 general election manifestos of the ten 
parties represented in the House of Commons, plus the BNP and UKIP. 
 
 
Notes. 0 indicates balanced use of party name and pronoun. Negative numbers indicate more 
pronoun than party name, and positive numbers indicate more party name than pronoun. Parties from 
left to right: Labour, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Scottish National Party, Green Party, Social 
Democratic and Labour Party, Plaid Cymru, Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Féin, British National 
Party, Alliance and UKIP. 
 
Figure 5 contains a scale stretching from -3 to +1. On this scale, zero indicates 
a balanced use of pronoun and party name. Negative numbers are indicative of a 
predominant use of the pronoun we as word form of self-reference while positive 
numbers indicate that the parties’ preferred choice of word form is their own party 
name. The numbers show that the BNP clearly belongs to the party name 
“cluster”, although its linguistic choices are somewhat more balanced than those 
of UKIP, which relatively speaking is the most self-boosting party on the British 
political scene. In the UKIP manifesto, UKIP is three times more frequent than 
we. It seems then that Edwards’ explanation is valid for UKIP as well; like the 
BNP, UKIP is a small right-wing party struggling to gain legitimacy and remain 
in clear opposition to all other parties. UKIP’s use of party name, just like the 
BNP’s, has increased since 2005. 1.01% of the word forms in the 2005 manifesto 
were instances of party name while 0.68% was instances of pronoun, which would 
position UKIP further to the left in the diagram. 
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Rather surprisingly, we find the miniscule Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, 
a liberal party which stands in stark contrast to the BNP and UKIP, on the right-
hand side. Most parties, among them many regional ones, balance their use of 
pronoun and party name. However, the three largest traditional parties are located 
on the far-left side. The question whether this, extrapolating from Edwards’ 
reasoning, is a sign of low self-confidence or an indication that the boundaries 
between traditional parties have been blurred, is open for discussion. It is of 
course possible to argue that repetitive self-referencing is in fact a sign of low 
self-confidence and that the bigger, traditional parties do not need to tell the voters 
who they are. Such claims, however, would rather indicate an unfortunate state of 
self-assurance rather than genuine self-confidence. Moreover, it would be 
negative from a marketing point of view not to tell your potential voters who you 
are. 
Regardless of what a change in the frequency of a linguistic feature indexes, it 
is clear that both the BNP and UKIP have adopted the same tactic of addressing 
the electorate. As seen in Table 4, this tactic is uncommon. The major trend 
observed in the 2010 general election manifestos of the parties represented in the 
House of Commons is a general decline in the use of party name and an increase 
in the use of we. Besides the BNP and UKIP, the only party with a noteworthy 
increase in use of party names is Plaid Cymru; another nationalist party. This does 
not seem to be endemic to nationalist parties, however, as the change in Sinn Féin 
use of party name is marginal while the SNP follows the trend with increased we 
and decreased use of party name. 
 
Table 4. Percentages of we and party name in the 2005 and 2010 general election manifestos 
of the ten Westminster parties and the BNP and UKIP. 
Parties  we party name 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Alliance 0,54 0,58 1,42 1,4 
British National Party 1,28 0,78 0,13 1,3 
Conservatives 2,12 2,45 0,45 0,25 
Democratic Unionist Party 1,08 0,9 1,22 0,84 
Green 1,21 1,05 0,96 0,5 
Labour 2,38 2,28 0,19 0,08 
Liberal Democrats 5,12 1,31 2,18 0,4 
Plaid Cymru 1,87 1,98 0,68 1,43 
SDLP 0,88 1,76 0,82 0,84 
Sinn Fein 0,43 0,75 0,8 0,87 
Scottish National Party 1,74 2,07 1,0 0,58 
UKIP 1,01 0,38 0,68 1,13 
 
Party names are frequent forms of self-reference in the BNP-UKIP corpus as a 
whole. Table 5 shows the frequency of party name and pronoun for each corpus 
section. 
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Table 5. Forms of self-reference in the articles and policy sections of the BNP and UKIP 
subcorpora.  
 BNP UKIP 
 Articles Policies Articles Policies 
party name 1116 (0.32%) 547 (0.51%) 3155 (0.9%) 759 (0.72%) 
we 2062 (0.59%) 733 (0.68%) 2074 (0.59%) 403 (0.38%) 
Notes. The numbers are raw frequencies from the corpus sections with section 
percentages in parentheses, which allow for cross-section and cross-party comparison. 
 
As seen in Table 5, we is the BNP’s preferred form of self-reference both in 
policy documents and in articles, where it is almost twice as common as the party 
name. What is particularly striking about these numbers is that UKIP is the 
preferred form in both UKIP articles (0.9%) and policy documents (0.72%). A 
party name self-reference is almost three times more likely to occur in an article 
published on the UKIP website than on the BNP equivalent. This can be 
interpreted as an attempt from UKIP’s side to establish a rapport with the people 
who visit its website. Depending on whether the visitor is a potential voter or a 
member, such a strategy seeks either to include the visitor in the in-group or re-
affirm that person’s membership of the group. The BNP’s numbers might seem 
low in comparison with those of UKIP, but in comparison with most political 
parties the BNP’s self-referencing is quite frequent. UKIP’s numbers are merely a 
little more frequent in this respect. The frequent occurrence of party name in BNP 
and UKIP texts can be explained by the same underpinning logic. Party names 
serve partly to inform voters about ideology but also to communicate how the 
parties are different from all other parties, which is a claim I will elaborate in the 
next section. 
It should be stressed that party names, despite being important in the sense that 
they inform the voter about a party’s ideology, also can be used in order to project 
a partly or wholly false image. For example, there is nothing that suggests that the 
English Democrats are more democratic, or for that sake more English, than any 
other political party operating in England. This scepticism concerning form and 
function is well-rooted in British society, but has perhaps mainly been directed 
towards non-Brits. In the classical Instructions to British Servicemen in Germany 
1944, a booklet-size crash course in German society given to British troops before 
D-Day, the authors warn the reader that once Hitler is removed new parties will 
pop up, but “[e]ven if they have names similar to our parties they will have 
different problems and different aims” (Bodleian Library, 2008, p. 46). 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the names BNP and UKIP are not 
accurate descriptions of the present electoral landscape. Despite their holistic 
image, BNP and UKIP are primarily English phenomena with limited influence in 
the rest of Britain. British identity is nonetheless an important concept to both 
parties. Richardson and Wodak (2009) have discussed the BNP’s use of the 
slogan “British jobs for British workers” (see 1.2). Interestingly, this slogan 
occurs 16 times in the UKIP subcorpus, as opposed to only 4 in the BNP 
subcorpus. However, while the BNP claims ownership to the slogan (see 
Richardson and Wodak, 2009, p. 252) UKIP seems less possessive. Former MEP 
John Whittaker, who has publicly stated that the party supports “British jobs for 
British workers”, claims not to be aware that the slogan has been used by any 
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other politician or political party, especially not Gordon Brown. “I’m quite sure 
that if Gordon Brown used that phrase it wasn’t his original phrase either. It’s 
been around since the last war and before”, he explains. He goes on to say that 
UKIP would not claim ownership to the slogan, and even suggests Labour as a 
potential source for it (J. Whittaker, personal communication, 7 November, 2012). 
In the next chapter, however, we will take a look at what UKIP and the BNP 
actually do claim as unique. 
4.2 Party image 
In this section the focus is on predication; a discursive strategy concerned with 
actors’ attributions of qualities. Here, I approach party image by investigating in 
what areas the BNP and UKIP claim unique competence, what qualities they do 
not want to be associated with and what qualities they attribute to each other. 
4.2.1 Unique competence 
Political survival can be said to be contingent on having or at least claiming to 
have unique competence; to have the only solution to a problem. The BNP, with 
its focus on Islam, often comes across as more extreme than UKIP, which focuses 
more on the EU and the consequences of supranational power structures. This 
might be due to the parties’ deployment of “uniqueness structures”. In this section 
I investigate how the parties claim uniqueness by using the adverb only 
(“BNP/UKIP is the only party to…”). This is a powerful, discriminating 
construction that stands out in the text, and which therefore is likely to catch the 
reader’s attention. Figure 6 illustrates the areas in which the BNP and UKIP claim 
unique competence. 
 
Figure 6. Ideological themes and policies with which the BNP and UKIP want to be 
associated. 
 
 
 40 
What is clear from the long lists of issues and areas in Figure 6 is that both 
parties mix abstract, ideological themes with more concrete policies. UKIP’s 
policies are, in comparison with the BNP, more concrete or perhaps banal
21
. For 
example, UKIP claims to be the only party that wants to ban the burqa, abolish 
tuition fees and restore weekly bin collections; all concrete policies that the party 
wants to be associated with. UKIP also makes statements that are impossible to 
prove, e.g. that it is the only party advocating sustainable fishing policies, the only 
party that voters can trust and the only party that really makes sense when you 
think about it. UKIP’s self-proclaimed competence is also quite extensive, 
encompassing areas such as education, constitutional structure, defence, 
agriculture, fiscal policy and culture. 
The BNP seems to ground its uniqueness in more abstract, ideological themes. 
Several ideological categories can be identified, e.g. an ultranationalist and a 
traditional left-wing one. The ultranationalist claims to uniqueness are concerned 
with the preservation of a British identity, the discontinuation of foreign aid and 
the abolishment of the Human Rights Act (and some would perhaps argue the 
deportation of criminals). Interesting to note are the claims which perhaps 
historically have been more associated with the left, e.g. claims to be the only 
green party in Britain, the re-nationalization of industries and the claim to be the 
only party for hard-working people. Several claims contain no meaning unless the 
voter is already familiar with the BNP’s ideology and policies. To uninitiated 
voters, such statements provide no information at all. A parallel discourse can also 
be found; the BNP claims to be the only British party to stand up for human 
rights, but also to be the only party that wants to abolish the Human Rights Act, 
suggesting difficulties to accept humankind in terms of sameness. 
There are a number of areas in which the parties overlap; immigration and EU 
are two such areas. One belief that the two parties share, and which is typical of 
parties trying to cash in on voters’ discontent, is that all other parties waste 
money. The BNP and UKIP do also have similar opinions about the environment; 
they claim to be the only parties to realize that climate change, to the extent there 
is such a thing, is not man-made. 
 
The BNP is the only party to oppose the global warming theory and to argue in 
favour of a reasonable, calm and rational approach to environmental care. 
(BNP subcorpus, policy documents section) 
 
UKIP are the only party that believe man-made climate change does not exist, and 
our view has been vindicated by today's ruling. 
(UKIP subcorpus, articles subsection) 
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 I use banal to distinguish between policies concerned with mundane issues (e.g. bin collection) 
and more structural or complex policies and ideologies (e.g. design of tax systems, foreign policy). 
Banal nationalism is a term coined by Billig (1995) and refers to the everyday means of 
reproducing the nation (p. 6). Billig explains the difference between the conceptualizations of 
nationalism as a peripheral (e.g. BNP) or intermittent (winning a competition) phenomenon and as 
an “endemic condition” by using a flag metaphor. Banal nationalism does not refer to attention-
seeking waving of flags (as employed by nationalist groups), but rather to less conspicuous uses, 
(e.g. the hanging of a flag outside a government building) (pp. 39ff). 
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There are in fact other areas in which the two parties overlap, but they are 
harder to find using corpus methods. As I suggested earlier in this section, the 
reason why UKIP might be perceived as more Eurosceptic than the BNP or the 
BNP as more Islamophobic than UKIP might be due to their wording. The only-
construction is, as has been pointed out, used in order to foreground a certain 
quality, but the fact that a certain quality is not foregrounded in a party discourse 
does not entail that it is not there. One example of this concerns the Human Rights 
Act. The BNP claims to be the only party in Britain wanting to repeal it, however, 
there are plenty of instances in which UKIP makes similar demands, although 
never using the only-construction. 
4.2.2 Negation 
Now that we know what political image the parties project, it is time to investigate 
what image they do not wish to have. The process is the reverse, i.e. I search for 
instances in which the party names co-occur with a negation. The presence of 
negation in relation to party name is interesting mainly for two reasons. First, to 
negate in the sense ‘to disapprove of a policy’ sends virtually the same signals and 
functions much in the same way as a positive declaration. That is, the BNP and 
UKIP have not made a name for themselves as champions for new policies or new 
legislation; they are meeting places for naysayers. Second, negation suggests that 
the responsible layers of the parties are aware of the less flattering descriptions of 
them circulating in the media and that there are voters who have a negative 
perception of them. The difference in how the parties perceive their critics can be 
seen by comparing the example sentences in Table 6 and Table 7. 
 
Table 6. Concordance showing what the BNP claims not to be. 
1 BNP is not just a party; it is a providential movement. We have a destiny, so things happen to us 
2 BNP is NOT a “normal political party.” In fact, in reality, we are much more than a political party 
3 BNP is not a ‘racist’ or ‘racial’ or ‘racialist’ or ‘race-conscious’ or ‘white’ or ‘whitepeople’s’ party 
4 BNP is not a ‘fascist’ or ‘fascistic,’ let alone a ‘Nazi’ or ‘neo-Nazi’ or ‘national socialist’ party. 
5 BNP is not an ‘extreme’ or ‘extremist’ party. It must never be referred to as such, and anyone who  
6 BNP is not ‘anti-Europe.’ We are ‘anti-EU’ or ‘anti-European Union’ or ‘anti-Brussels.’ Europe,  
7 BNP is not an antisemitic party: we do not believe that Jews per se are bad, though we do, of course 
8 BNP is not a ‘hate group’ and does not ‘hate’ anybody, with the possible exception of members  
 
Table 6 contains several concordance lines which sum up the kind of image 
problem from which the BNP suffers. The BNP is often classified as fascist by 
scholars (see e.g. Copsey, 2004, 2011; Goodwin, 2011; Holmes, 2000; 
Richardson, 2011), and the members are aware of this. Table 6 contains forms of 
self-identification that the BNP will not have collocate with the party name, such 
as racist, white, fascist, Nazi, neo-Nazi, extreme, anti-EU, anti-Semitic and hate 
group. This is completely understandable since the BNP is not the sort of racist 
party that wants to appear racist. This might sound perfectly obvious, even stupid 
to point out. However, historically, extremism has been seen as a positive quality 
by leading actors in the British far-right. For example, in 1962, original BNP co-
founder Colin Jordan, who had begun to express more and more support for 
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Nazism, left the original BNP to form the National Socialist Movement (Thurlow, 
1987, p. 264). Members of the present-day BNP are of course aware of how they 
are perceived and have gone to some lengths to deny accusations of racism. There 
have, however, been attempts to justify racism, as seen in the extract from an 
article below. 
 
What the English language does not provide, is a word to define an understanding of 
the circumstances where belief in superiority of a superior race, is appropriate or 
acceptable, or what definition or use of superior is or can be meant. 
(BNP subcorpus, articles section) 
 
This type of meta-pragmatic statement gives us an opportunity to get inside 
the lexicon of a BNP member. This is only a small part of a bigger plan to 
redefine racism as ‘anti-white’, which can be seen in the leaflet Racism Cuts Both 
Ways, in which anti-white racism is connected to, amongst other things, 
grooming, and in which the BNP describes its members as victims by using a 
Shylock quote from Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice (p. 1). Perhaps the 
nature of the BNP really can be summed up using its own words. While we may 
agree that the BNP is not a “normal political party”, as expressed in line 2 in 
Table 6, it is more questionable whether its members really are working towards a 
pre-determined (divine) goal, as suggested in line 1.
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Table 7. Concordance showing what UKIP claims not to be. 
1 UKIP is not antiimmigrant, racist or xenophobic. UKIP has members who were themselves once i 
2 UKIP is not anti-immigration. We propose a five-year freeze to sort out the current system then  
3 UKIP is not just about the EU. I am passionate about this country which has been failed by the  
4 UKIP is not for lemmings; it is not for sheep. UKIP is for independent thinkers who share a 
5 UKIP is not opposed to some limited and controlled immigration but it must be solely in the interest  
6 UKIP is not difficult to discern. It's all down to the unpalatable policy of quitting the EU.UKIP goes  
7 UKIP is not fashionable. My own personal opinion of the party and Europe is irrelevant - until the 
 
Table 7 shows that UKIP also has to deny accusations of being racist, but 
racial aspects do not seem to bother UKIP. Instead, accusations of being a single-
issue party are denied (EU, immigration). Line 4 and 7 are particularly interesting 
as they are in fact examples of non-populist statements. This is perhaps the 
strongest reason why neither party deserves the fascist epithet, at least if we apply 
Griffin’s (1991) definition of fascism as “palingenetic populist ultra-nationalism” 
(p. 26). Many of the parties’ policies are simply too extreme and uncomfortable to 
appeal to the greater masses. 
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 Providence is a theological concept with a rich theoretical history, so the exact meaning here is 
open for debate. Judging by the context, however, it seems to be used interchangeably with 
destiny. The BNP’s use of providential, just like Hitler’s, could be said to be an example of what is 
called calculated ambivalence (see Richardson and Wodak, 2009), i.e. a discursive strategy which 
purposely allows several interpretations of an utterance. Providential would thus have the meaning 
‘destiny’ to non-Christians, while a Christian conceptualization could emphasize the divine nature 
of the predeterminism. 
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4.2.3 Mutual perceptions 
Media has sometimes suggested that the BNP and UKIP are part of the same 
phenomenon, a claim that has been met with protests from both parties. Not 
surprisingly, you will not find any instances in the corpus in which the parties 
explicitly admit that they agree with each other. Perhaps more surprising is the 
lack of aggressive tones when one party discusses the other. The BNP makes 61 
references to UKIP while UKIP makes 45 references to the BNP, of which almost 
all are found in news articles. To begin, we can establish that neither party spends 
much time denigrating the other, as seen in the plots in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Dispersion plots of the parties’ references to each other. 
 
The BNP’s references to UKIP: 58 in news articles, 3 in policy documents  
(not shown here). 
 
 
UKIP’s references to the BNP: 44 in news articles, 1 in policy documents 
(not shown here). 
 
These plots indicate that the instances of references are unevenly distributed, 
which suggest that the parties refer to each other at special times, e.g. during 
elections. Compare this to the distribution of references to the two major parties, 
the Conservatives and Labour, seen in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Dispersion plots of the BNP’s and UKIP’s references to the 
Conservatives and Labour. 
 
The BNP’s references to the Conservatives in news articles: 354. 
 
 
UKIP’s references to the Conservatives in news articles: 726. 
 
 
The BNP’s references to Labour in news articles: 269. 
 
 
UKIP’s references to Labour in news articles: 357. 
 
Rather than attacking each other, the BNP and UKIP take on a shared 
opposition role vis-à-vis Labour and the Conservatives. References to the two 
establishment parties are frequent and evenly distributed, making criticism of the 
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establishment a more salient feature than criticism of other nationalist 
organizations. 
A closer look at the micro contexts in which the party references occur shows 
that an overwhelming majority of the references serve a purely informative 
purpose, e.g. to report election results, to announce appearances in media, et 
cetera. The BNP’s references to UKIP that are not strictly informative are seen 
below. 
 
Do not condemn the entire membership of UKIP when some of they may join the 
BNP one day. [sic!] 
 
Naive UKIP-type 'anti-Europeans' who think that Greece and Italy are now under 
EU rule are missing the point. 
 
Well-known people like Neil Hamilton are only too aware that UKIP is simply a 
safety valve […] 
 
To the Daily Express and the plastic patriots of UKIP, the answer is summed up in 
one word: Brussels. 
 
[W]e understand more and more just why UKIP and similar small-c conservative 
Euro-sceptic outfits shy away from this area. 
 
UKIP is slavishly pro-bank, sickeningly internationalist and blatantly under the 
thumb of a small but noisy pro-Zionist lobby. 
 
The tone is far from aggressive; in fact, the first excerpt suggests that the BNP 
and UKIP are not dissimilar. It seems that rather than treating UKIP as an enemy 
to be destroyed, the BNP perceives UKIP as a naïve constellation manipulated by 
other, bigger forces, e.g. the political establishment, the EU, the Conservatives 
and a Jewish conspiracy. The tactic seems to be to simply dismiss UKIP as 
inadequate. Instances of non-informative references to the BNP by UKIP are even 
sparser, but completely different in nature. 
 
[…] there's a revulsion at both the professional political class and the racists and fascists 
of the BNP, which is why the UKIP vote is rising so strongly. 
 
The BNP are a racist party. Article 2 of their Constitution bans black and Asian candidates 
standing for them. UKIP is proud of having five multi-ethnic candidates standing for 
us on merit. 
 
Any attempts to address immigration issues in this country by the BNP are always tainted 
by xenophobia and racism. 
 
The tone is more aggressive and UKIP makes strong claims about the BNP’s 
ideological nature. UKIP describes the BNP as fascist, racist and xenophobic, i.e. 
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the very same labels that the BNP has tried to distance itself from. UKIP also 
seems to define itself by juxtaposing its own party demographics with that of the 
BNP. When the BNP still had a whites-only policy, as is discussed in one of the 
above excerpts, UKIP expressed its pride in its “multi-ethnic” candidates”. Five 
black or Asian candidates, if that is indeed what UKIP wants to convey with 
“multi-ethnic”, is a low number, but so little is needed in order to beat the BNP in 
terms of diversity. 
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5 The out-group analysis: immigration 
This chapter is concerned with the BNP’s and UKIP’s construction of 
immigration. In 5.1 the salience of immigration is established, and the main 
aspects of immigration in the BNP and UKIP discourses are identified. The 
aspects that are identified and discussed concern immigration nomenclature (5.2), 
quantification (5.3) and origin (5.4). 
5.1 Reconstructing the immigration discourses 
Immigration, and particularly the limitation or discontinuation of it, is without 
doubt one of the most important issues for the BNP and UKIP. As seen in 4.2, 
immigration is also one of the policy areas in which both parties claim to have 
unique competence. Based on a 2004 European elections poll, John and Margetts 
(2009) identify immigration as the policy area in which there is considerable 
overlap in voter sympathy between BNP and UKIP; immigration is the most 
important issue for 77% of the BNP voters, as compared to 53% for UKIP voters 
(p. 498). 
Charteris-Black (2006) sees the increase in the lexical frequency of 
immigration and asylum in the Conservatives’ 2005 general election manifesto as 
the starting point of the party’s adoption of new immigration policies. He notes 
that between 1945 and 2005, immigration had been used so sparsely that it had 
almost not been used at all. Asylum did in fact never appear in any Conservative 
manifesto before the 2001 general election (p. 564). 
Judging by the BNP-UKIP corpus data, immigration and immigrant(-s) are 
clearly salient features of both BNP and UKIP language, and far from taboo. The 
numbers and the dispersion of the features in the BNP-UKIP corpus are seen in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Dispersion plots of immigration and immigrant(-s) in the BNP 
and UKIP subcorpora. 
 
BNP: immigration. Articles: 380. Policies: 125. Total: 505. 
 
 
UKIP: immigration. Articles: 334. Policies: 246. Total: 580. 
 
 
BNP: immigrant(-s). Articles: 336. Policies: 50. Total: 386. 
 
 
UKIP: immigrant(-s). Articles: 74. Policies: 71. Total: 145. 
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Figure 9 shows that both immigration and immigrant(-s) are salient features in 
BNP and UKIP language, although immigration is more frequent. One possible 
explanation could be that it is much easier to blame problems on something that is 
vague and abstract, such as immigration, than on something concrete, such as 
individual immigrants, which would require specification. Immigrant(-s) are much 
more frequent in articles, which are “everyday texts”, than in policy documents, 
which are more offical texts supposed to focus on bigger issues and structures. It 
is also interesting to note that immigration is UKIP’s first choice of word form, to 
the extent that UKIP actually outperforms the BNP. On the other hand, the 
concrete forms immigrant(-s) are more frequent in the BNP subcorpus. 
By comparing lexical frequencies in the BNP and Conservative 2005 general 
election manifestos, Charteris-Black (2006) finds that centre-right parties tend to 
talk about immigration, while far-right parties talk about immigrants (p. 568). The 
numbers presented in Figure 9 show that this conclusion does not apply 
unproblematically to the BNP and UKIP. A wide discrepancy is found between 
the parties’ references to individual immigrants; BNP is far more likely to refer to 
immigrants than UKIP. The two parties’ preference of the abstract immigration in 
public policy documents and the mixing of word forms in articles could suggest 
the existence of parallel discourses, or what Richardson (2011) calls surface and 
depth, i.e. discourses aiming at insiders and outsiders respectively (pp. 38f). 
Although all article texts are publicly available on the parties’ websites, it is 
plausible to assume that the texts are written for an in-group; people already 
familiar with the party jargon. Richardson notes that, unlike in mass-distributed 
BNP leaflets, racist discourses are more easily discernable in more closed rooms, 
e.g. on the website (p. 46). 
To get a first impression of how the BNP and UKIP construct their 
immigration discourses, and to state which aspects will be highlighted, a list of 
collocates may be of help. Table 8 contains the ten words which collocate with 
immigration most frequently. 
 
Table 8. Collocates of immigration in the BNP and UKIP 
subcorpora using ranked frequency. 
BNP UKIP 
Collocate Frequency Collocate Frequency 
mass 110 action 76 
Britain 49 overdue 72 
British 30 mass 72 
policies 26 policy 57 
policy 21 UKIP 52 
illegal 19 Britain 39 
world 18 control 26 
people 18 illegal 24 
country 17 year 23 
party 15 labour 21 
 
The co-occurence of the features British, party and UKIP is indexical of the 
strong bond between the two parties and the immigration issue. The collocates 
listed in Table 8 are used in order to structure the chapter and to identify the 
lexical cornerstones of BNP and UKIP discourse. To begin with we can 
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triangulate the geographic context; both parties are primarily concerned with 
immigration in Britain, signalled by the high frequency of Britain in both 
subcorpora. World (18) in the BNP subcorpus refers mostly to immigration from 
Third World countries, however, the BNP discusses immigration in other parts of 
the world too in order to find deterrent examples. On the topic of multiculturalism 
(or multiracialism, as the BNP prefers to call it), the party concludes that: 
 
From Bosnia to Rwanda, Indonesia to Northern Ireland, one only has to scratch most 
of the conflicts in the world -- ranging from low-level loathing to outright genocide -
- to find that at the root of the problem is the juxtaposition by past migration or 
strategic decision by a ruling class of two or more different peoples in the same 
piece of territory. 
 
Another frequent collocate seen in Table 8 is illegal; a word pertaining to 
immigrants’ status, and which will be discussed in 5.2. The quantifier mass occurs 
110 and 72 times in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora respectively, making it the 
most and third most frequent collocate of immigration. Quantification of 
immigrants will be discussed in 5.3. An aspect typical of immigration discourse is 
reference to country of origin, which I discuss in 5.4. 
5.2 “Who are ‘they’?” 
If you migrate you are not necessarily an immigrant. There is a complicated 
vocabulary applicable for situations in which people cross national borders, just 
like there are plenty of metaphors used for the actual crossing. The dispersion 
plots in Figure 9 highlighted the saliency of immigrant(-s) in both subcorpora, but 
now we are going to include two other words pertaining to the legal status of 
immigrants, namely asylum seeker and refugee. The frequency of the three labels 
is compared in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Raw frequency of asylum seeker(-s), immigrant(-s) and refugee(-s). 
 BNP UKIP 
 Articles Policies Articles Policies 
asylum seeker(-s) 103 10 11 19 
immigrant(-s) 336 50 77 80 
refugee(-s) 29 14 5 19 
 
The features seen in Table 9 are the ones that I will focus on here. On a 
morphological level, all three features are considerably more frequent in the 
plural, although this does not seem to have any semantic significance, hence my 
decision not to present singular and plural forms separately. It is worth noting, 
however, that while the frequency is still low, there are more instances of the 
singular asylum seeker in the BNP subcorpus, and as a consequence, more 
references to individuals. Asylum seeker(-s) is the second most frequent form used 
by both parties but is almost four times more frequent in the BNP subcorpus, 
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particularly in the articles section. Immigrant(-s) is, as shown earlier, a popular 
choice, unlike refugee which is rare regardless of party and text type. 
Before looking closer at these features it seems suitable to return to the notion 
of discourse prosody and a concern raised by Baker and McEnery (2005), namely 
that “if the term asylum seeker is perpetually paired with a range of concepts that 
express falsity, then eventually people may be primed to think of this concept 
whenever they encounter the term asylum seeker” (p. 218). There is nothing 
conspicuous about politicians speaking in favour of their own ideas while 
dismissing their opponents, but the discourse prosody of asylum seeker, 
immigrant and refugee is particularly negative in the hands of the BNP and UKIP. 
Asylum seeker(-s) are preceded by attributes in 17 instances in the BNP 
subcorpus: Afghan (1), alleged (1), bogus (10), failed (1), Indonesian (1), Iranian 
(1), Islamic (1) and legal (1). The corresponding number for UKIP is 8: bogus (5), 
existing (1), failed (1) and many (1). There are a number of national adjectives in 
the BNP subcorpus, and they are mainly used in order to identify individual 
asylum seekers rather than an undistinguishable mass. Bogus is the most frequent 
attribute used by both parties, and this word sums up their immigration discourses 
quite well, i.e. that there cannot possibly be any “real” asylum seekers in Britain 
because of the country’s geographical location. This line of argument, which is 
based on the Dublin Regulation (a law determining which EU member state is 
responsible for handling asylum claims), is elaborated in the text excerpts below. 
 
Only the British National Party will bring an end to the invasion of our country. The 
British National Party argues that asylum seekers have the right of refuge in the first 
safe country bordering the one they flee, and do not have the right to cross any safe 
countries to reach Britain. 
(BNP subcorpus, articles section) 
 
The terms of the 1951 Convention of Refugees should be strictly enforced so that 
asylum seekers should seek refuge in the first designated safe country they come to, 
until such time as Britain withdraws from the Convention and replaces it with our 
own laws for the application and granting of asylum. We should repeal the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights. 
These have prevented the courts from expelling terrorists, extremists, criminals, 
bogus asylum seekers and undesirable aliens. 
(UKIP subcorpus, articles section) 
 
It is not surprising that immigrant is the label most widely adopted by both 
parties since its definition, unlike that of refugee(-s) and asylum seeker(-s), is not 
internationally regulated. Immigration is the most frequent term used to refer to 
people who migrate to Britain, and the word’s discourse prosody is clearly 
negative. Table 10 contains the attributive pre-modifiers of the search terms 
immigrant(-s), minus national adjectives (which will be discussed in 5.4). 
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Table 10. Pre-modifying collocates of immigrant(-s) in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora. 
 illegal (65), Muslim (6), many (5), new (5), cheap (3), second (3), permanent (2), 
Christian (1), criminal (1), economic (1), fellow (1), few (1), foreign (1), historical 
(1), Islamic (1), large (1), other (1), past (1), previous (1), single (1), skilled (1), 
ungrateful (1), unskilled (1), wealthy (1) 
 
BNP 
 
  
UKIP illegal (31), aspiring (1), foreign (1), new (1), unemployed (1), unskilled (1), 
unwanted (1)  
Note. Collocates occur one space to the left of the search term (L1, R-). 
 
Table 10 shows that the adjective that most frequently collocates with 
immigrant(-s) in both subcorpora is illegal, amounting to 61 and 84% respectively 
of all attributive collocates of immigrant(-s). It is not surprising that two anti-
immigration parties adopt this tactic, but it is still interesting to note how feelings 
of disapproval permeate every aspect of the framing of this policy area. Collocates 
such as skilled, unskilled and unemployed indicate concern for immigrants’ ability 
to adapt to the labour market. 
Baker and McEnery (2005) conclude that, while still negative, the discourse 
prosody of refugee in newspaper texts is not nearly as negative as that of asylum 
seeker (p. 222). My findings show that the word does carry negative connotations, 
but the parties’ disapproval is not primarily directed against the refugees, but 
rather the judicial structures which allow people to claim the status of refugee. 
The word forms refugee(-s) are considerably less frequent than immigrant(-s) and 
asylum seeker(-s), which is likely due to the confusion concerning the exact 
meaning of the word and other words semantically contiguous to migration. This 
can be seen in Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Concordance of refugee(-s) in the BNP subcorpus. 
1 can stop genocide. Real safe areas or  refugee  escape corridors should be established with 
2 will be prepared to contribute funds to  refugee  relief programmes which respect these. 
3 existence of legitimate international  refugees  from persecution and war, but point to the fact 
4 represent a movement of truly needy  refugees  but rather ‘another phase in the deliberate and 
5 the immigrants from Tunisia were  refugees  and the bulk were economic migrants. Wim  
6 4,000 people judged to be “genuine  refugees ”. Australia has gullibly gifted Malaysia with £5 
7 no to cashlessness’, which focuses on  refugees  who have been refused entry to the UK. It was 
8 enforcement of the UK so that, with respect to  refugees  and illegal immigrants, there are no blind eyes 
9 `equality', postMarxist fixation on turning  refugees  and immigrants into a surrogate proletariat, or 
10 coming to Britain and claming asylum or  refugee  status, then it clearly benefits us to support 
11 the nearest safe country. So, unless a flood of  refugees  from a civil war in France or Denmark shows up 
12 peoples of European descent, who arrived as  refugees  or economic immigrants centuries or decades  
 
The first two lines in Table 11 entail an increase in spending on non-British 
people. It is, however, an official BNP policy to offer financial incentives to 
people of “foreign descent […] who wish to leave permanently” (BNP 
Immigration). The discursive strategy applied here is likely to aim at turning 
refugee into a word accompanied by suspicion by making it co-occur with words 
or other elements seeking to negate its validity, as in line 6 where quotation marks 
are used to suggest that 4,000 refugees are impostors. The juxtaposition of truly 
needy and unworthy refugees is also seen in line 4. Refugee(-s) collocate with 
economic migrants (line 5 and 8), illegal immigrants (line 8) immigrants (line 9) 
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and asylum [seeker] (line 10); all are attempts to give refugee a negative discourse 
prosody. The suggestion in line 7, that refugees would be denied entry, is anti-
semantic, i.e. it is contesting the core semantics of the word. According to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 1951), an asylum 
seeker is a person who claims to be a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been 
evaluated, i.e. once a country has given you refugee status, that country cannot 
deny you entrance. This is regulated in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, which is a document that the BNP is familiar with. 
 
Under present circumstances we would abide by our obligations under the 1951 
United Nations Convention on Refugees. We recognise the existence of legitimate 
international refugees from persecution and war, but point to the fact that 
international law provides that such persons must be given -- and must seek -- refuge 
in the nearest safe country. So, unless a flood of refugees from a civil war in France 
or Denmark shows up on our shores, these refugees are simply not Britain's 
responsibility and have no right to refuge here. 
(BNP subcorpus, policy section) 
 
The BNP seeks to obfuscate the regulated meaning of refugee by using it 
interchangeably with other terms whereas UKIP makes a clear distinction between 
asylum seeker (the negative stage) and refugee (the neutral stage), e.g. by 
referring to the UN Convention on Refugees. 
 
Table 12. Concordance of refugee(-s) in the UKIP subcorpus. 
1 refusal of their application, is pending. ‘ Refugee means an asylum seeker whose application has  
2 a binding definition of who qualifies as a  refugee . It had been adopted by the British Government  
3 citizen or permanent resident, may sponsor a  refugee  or humanitarian applicant provided that they  
4 asylum system. They also have a commendable  refugee  and humanitarian entrant system whereby an  
5 to assist individual asylum applicants seeking  refugee  status. Immigration: Action Overdue! 7 14. 
6  rise in illegal immigrants. At the Traiskirchen  refugee  camp in Austria, numbers have more than,  
7 Britain if they met United Nations criteria for  refugee  status, Mr Bloom pointed out. They would have  
8 is in part implemented in the UK by the  Refugee  or Person in Need of International Protection 
9 of 450,000 asylum cases of migrants refused  refugee status (plus their dependants) but who had not  
10 numbers being accepted. There should be a  Refugee Sponsorship Scheme’ that allows British citizens  
11 has been successful. In its broader context ‘ refugee ’ is someone fleeing civil war or natural disaster 
12 a set of criteria for qualifying either for  refugee  or subsidiary protection status and also dictates 
13 1951 Convention. Britain has always accepted  refugees  fleeing actual physical persecution, or who had 
14 to work at all. 6.7 There is a perception that  refugees  and asylum seekers are given priority in the 
15 amnesty. The terms of the 1951 Convention of  Refugees  should be strictly enforced so that asylum seeker 
16 existing terms of the 1951 UN Convention on  Refugees  until Britain replaces it with an Asylum Act. To  
17 be able to set quotas for the number of  refugees  accepted each year. Say they set a quota of 10,00 
18 third countries, including stateless persons or  refugees . "The EU has just voted itself the use and abuse 
19 the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of  Refugees  and replace it with an Act of Parliament  
20 existing terms of the 1951 UN Convention on  Refugees  regarding the application for political asylum 
21 the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of  Refugees  on the grounds that if he or she is returned to 
22 1948. Sizable groups of displaced persons and  refugees came to Britain after World War II;  
 
As becomes clear from an investigation of the concordance lines in Table 12, 
UKIP’s use of refugee is in line with UNHCR’s definition. UKIP’s goal is 
ultimately the same as the BNP’s, i.e. considerably reduced immigration. While 
the BNP seeks to associate the researched word forms (immigrant, asylum seeker 
and refugee) with negative connotations until they are part of one big frame of 
suspicion, UKIP reinforces and interpret internationally agreed criteria used for 
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confirming the legitimacy of a person’s refugee claim. This, of course, entails that 
everyone judged not to be refugees are illegal immigrants. 
 
 
5.3  “How many are there?” 
This chapter is concerned with quantification of immigrants, and I should start by 
saying that the term quantification is used quite liberally here. Rather than 
imposing a semantic-syntactic set of criteria, I choose to define quantification as 
an instance whose primary discursive function is to convey information or opinion 
about number or mass. 
The BNP and UKIP are two anti-immigration parties, so naturally 
quantification of immigrants is an important aspect of their communication. This 
can hardly be seen as a shocking discovery; however, quantification can take 
different guises and varies in terms of offensiveness and explicitness. If we by 
explicitness intend instances in which the target words asylum seeker(-s), 
immigrant(-s) and refugee(-s) are accompanied by exact numerical specifications, 
(e.g. “From 1997 to 2008 over 6 million immigrants entered the UK”), then the 
corpus contains a number of such explicit constructions. Consider Table 13, 
which sums up all instances of the target words occurring within a distance of 50 
spaces to the left and right of numerical quantifications. 
 
Table 13. Instances of asylum seeker(-s), immigrant(-s) and 
refugee(-s) accompanied by numerical quantifications in the 
BNP and UKIP subcorpora. 
 BNP UKIP 
asylum seeker(-s) 7 0 
immigrant(-s) 21 18 
refugee(-s) 1 1 
 
These numbers are very low. Rather than adopting a fact-driven approach and 
provide numbers, which would be the most effective way if you genuinely believe 
the numbers are on your side, both parties construct their immigration discourses 
by using less specified quantifications. As we saw in Table 8, mass is the most 
frequent collocate of immigration in the BNP subcorpus and the third commonest 
in the UKIP subcorpus. A search for attributive collocates occurring to the left of 
immigration, listed in Table 14, reveals that quantification is an important part of 
the BNP’s and UKIP’s immigration discourses, despite not being frequently 
expressed by numbers.
23
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 Since exact specifications are unlikely to show up as collocates, I searched specifically for all 
occurrences of numbers in the corpus. The investigation showed that specification such as 218000 
immigrants are indeed rare, and I therefore chose to focus more on less precise expressions. 
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Table 14. Raw frequency of attributive collocates of immigration in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora. 
 mass (86), illegal (16), net (15), current (4), actual (3), uncontrolled (3), high (2), 
huge (2), Islamic (2), Muslim (2), altered (1), chief (1), disastrous (1), insane (1), 
irregular (1), permanent (1), strong (1), suicidal (1), Tory (1), unabated (1), 
unfettered (1), unlimited (1) 
 
BNP 
 
  
 mass (35), illegal (16), net (13), uncontrolled (9), future (7), controlled (4), current 
(4), unlimited (4), common (3), new (3), huge (2), lax (2), legitimate (2), permanent 
(2), coloured (1), deceitful (1), discredited (1), discriminatory (1), effective (1), 
foreign (1), full (1), inward (1), legal (1), limited (1), planned (1), radical (1), 
residential (1), serious (1), Tory (1), unending (1), unprecedented (1), workable (1) 
 
UKIP 
 
 
Note. Collocates occur one space to the left of the search term (L1, R-). 
 
Besides mass, which is the most frequent quantifying collocate in both 
subcorpora, there are a number of other words used to quantify immigrants: net, 
huge, high, unlimited. Negatively charged adjectives, such as illegal, are used by 
both parties, but also adjectives invoking stronger emotions, e.g. suicidal (BNP) 
and deceitful (UKIP). 
So, how many immigrants are there? A simple answer would be “a lot”. 
However, as pointed out by Baker and McEnery (2005) and Charteris-Black 
(2006) just to name a few, immigration is typically measured in metaphors of 
natural disasters. Charteris-Black finds that conceptualizations of immigration as 
uncontrollable bodies of water are prevalent in BNP manifestos, and links these 
metaphors to a wider right-wing frame (p. 570). This type of metaphor exists in 
the BNP and UKIP subcorpora as well, as seen in Table 15 and Table 16. 
 
Table 15. Examples of water metaphors in relation to immigration in the BNP subcorpus. 
governments had expressed concern about the floods of asylum seekers from North Africa early this year  
on Government for more money to support the flood of immigrants the town and surrounding area has to put  
The ridiculous lie that floods of immigrants from alien countries ‘enrich’ Britain has been 
people suffering from this seemingly endless flow of immigrants. Lampedusa residents feel that the Italian 
they had already been replaced by the latest wave of immigrants? Just as the Lib/Lab/Cons were prepared to 
and private relief groups for the inevitable tide of refugees to come. Stage 7: EXTERMINATION begins,  
in the nearest safe country. So, unless a flood of refugees from a civil war in France or Denmark shows up on 
 
Immigration is conceptualized as uncontrollable and uncountable natural 
forces, something that is perhaps better expressed by a word like mass than by 
precise numbers. Incidentally, as seen in Table 14, uncontrolled is one of the 
attributes that collocates with immigration in both subcorpora. Water metaphors 
can also be found in the UKIP subcorpus. 
 
Table 16. Examples of water metaphors in relation to immigration in the UKIP subcorpus. 
the EU even if it did nothing to stem the flow of immigrants from EU member states. Ministers predicted the 
and did not touch on any ways to stem the tide of immigrants coming from the EU. And in a separate  
And it is not just the threat of a wave of immigrants from Turkey. In recent weeks three EU member  
to accommodate the current and intended waves of immigrants. Government concern for the environment  
immigrants to pay pensions of the preceding waves of immigrants. It has been calculated that to maintain the  
into account future illegal immigration and the possible influx of migrants from new entry countries to the  
the cap would be, and did not touch on any ways to stem the tide of immigrants coming from the EU. And in  
 
 54 
While these findings establish that there are similarities between the two 
parties’ immigration discourses, it does not, however, prove that their use of water 
metaphors is intended to dehumanize immigrants or that such metaphors are 
negatively charged per se. After all, the metaphors seen in Table 15 and Table 16 
also occur in newspaper texts. For example, Baker and McEnery (2005) find 
several instances of water metaphors in both newspaper articles and texts 
published by the UNHCR (pp. 204, 211), and Charteris-Black (2006) finds similar 
constructions on the website of broadsheet The Telegraph. Refaie (2001) claims 
that the conceptualization of immigrants as large, uncontrollable bodies of water 
has been naturalized, and that this not only has a bearing on the way we talk about 
immigration, but on how we can justify shielding us from it (p. 366). It seems like 
it is morally acceptable to talk about human beings as inanimate objects. 
The instances of these metaphors help us understand party discourse if 
contrasted with a reference corpus. The metaphor wave of has been investigated 
by the aforementioned scholars, and is also frequent in the BNP-UKIP corpus. 
Table 17 contains the 20 most frequent right-hand collocates following the 
metaphor wave of in the Corpus of Contemporary American English. 
 
Table 17. Right-hand collocates of wave of in COCA. 
nausea (91) relief (38) fear (26) 
violence (81) popularity (35) suicide (23) 
immigrants (69) interest (33) protests (21) 
immigration (65) pain (29) refugees (21) 
attacks (42) mergers (28) terrorism (21) 
panic (41) democratization (27) anger (21) 
dizziness (38) heat (27)  
Note. Collocates occur one space to the right of the search terms (L-, R1). 
 
Many of the collocates in Table 17 carry negative connotations (nausea, 
violence, attacks, panic, dizziness, pain, fear, suicide, terrorism and anger) and it 
is therefore reasonable to assume that they mainly occur in negative contexts. But 
some of the words are clearly positive (relief, popularity, interest, 
democratization), even if there of course are people who might argue that 
popularity does more harm than good and that democracy is not the optimal form 
of government. Others are neutral (mergers, heat). Protests is perhaps more 
context-dependent than any other word on the list and might be perceived either 
way. What the reference corpus tells us is that this particular water metaphor may 
be naturalized, but the discourse prosody is far from neutral. It also shows a more 
nuanced picture, as opposed to the BNP’s and UKIP’s noir use. Wave of occurs 54 
times in the BNP-UKIP corpus. The largest variation is in the BNP subcorpus, 
where it occurs with noun phrases such as attacks, barbarity, black mob violence, 
budget cuts, colonisation, domestic budget cuts, fake e-mails, heterosexual AIDS, 
petty crime, redundancies and smears. There are eighteen instances of wave(-s) of 
in the UKIP subcorpus, of which eleven co-occur with immigration or immigrants 
(there are only three such instances in the BNP subcorpus). Other uses of wave(-s) 
of in the UKIP subcorpus include terrorist attacks, Marxist sympathisers and new 
EU legislation. In conclusion, the discourse prosody of wave(-s) of is 
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overwhelmingly negative in both party discourses. In fact, the only positive use 
occurs in a UKIP article. 
 
Mr Reeve, recently re-elected to Huntingdon council on a wave of grass-roots 
support, continued: “And anyway, if the council cares so much about the way its 
residents put out their bins it should be checking up itself, not getting its taxpayers to 
do its dirty work.” 
 
Other water metaphors are also quite frequent. The construction influx of 
occurs sixteen times in the BNP subcorpus and four times in the UKIP subcorpus, 
and they all refer to immigrants, particularly labour migration. Tide of occurs five 
times in the BNP subcorpus and collocates with immigration (four instances) and 
refugees (1 instance). UKIP’s use of this particular metaphor is more varied. In 
Figure 10, which contains a picture published on the UKIP website in February 
2013 (not a part of the corpus), tide is used in relation to the EU. 
 
Figure 10. A picture used by UKIP to argue that David Cameron cannot renegotiate Britain’s 
relationship with the EU. 
 
 
However, not all instances serve to identify an out-group as detrimental to 
Britain. In fact, I have managed to find two instances in which the tide metaphor 
is used in order to spread the picture of UKIP as an up-and-coming electoral 
force. 
 
We go into the Euro elections next year full of confidence and riding on a incoming 
tide of growing Euroscepticism across the continent. 
 
You should not underestimate the tide of feeling that is growing against the stupidity 
and greed of the EU machine. 
 
No corresponding instances have been found in the BNP subcorpus. 
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5.4  “Where do ‘they’ come from?” 
Baker and McEnery (2005) note how in newspaper texts, reports about refugees 
are frequently accompanied by information about country of origin (p. 202). The 
BNP-UKIP corpus shows that, besides accentuating Britain’s recipient position, 
the parties also speculate where immigrants come from. Many of the concordance 
lines of immigration and immigrant(-s) contain specifications of origin. The 
findings are presented in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. References to country of origin and nationality in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora. 
 
 
It might be difficult to discern a specific country in Figure 11, but the visual 
representations only serve to illustrate the variety of countries or regions referred 
to by the parties. Although the total frequency of immigration and immigrant(-s) 
is much higher in the corpus, BNP and UKIP mention country of origin or 
nationality in relation to these words explicitly 55 and 27 times respectively. In 
addition to making more references to country of origin than UKIP, the BNP also 
uses more than twice as many country names. There is, however, a great deal of 
overlapping between the forms used, with both parties talking about immigration 
from the EU whilst also referring to individual EU member states. UKIP’s 
Eurosceptic nature is corroborated; according to UKIP, immigrants come mainly 
from the EU (8) or from Eastern Europe (6). With most Eastern European 
countries already members of the EU, the question is whether transfer of power to 
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Brussels is the only fear underpinning UKIP’s Euroscepticism – there are, for 
example, no references to Scandinavian immigrants. References to Cyprus, Hong 
Kong, Ireland and Malta are not concerned with contemporary immigration; 
rather, these countries are given as examples of historical immigration that has not 
had any negative or major impact on Britain. Needless to say, these are all places 
that have experienced British influence to varying degrees. 
The BNP also makes reference to former Soviet vassal states, but unlike UKIP 
it lists several Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries. Wider geographical 
terms such as Eastern Europe (4), Middle East (1), Northern Africa (3) and Third 
World (14) are also used. Generally speaking, it is a cleaver tactic to use broad 
geographical names since you do not actually need to know from where people 
come, and you avoid the risk of being corrected by someone who actually does. 
UKIP provides us with an extreme example in the form of the truly unspecific 
poor countries. There is only one occurrence of Third World in the UKIP 
subcorpus, while the BNP subcorpus contains 150 instances, and 131 of them are 
in the articles section. Most of those occurrences touch upon the notion that 
Britain is slowly, or stealthily, being invaded by alien species. The topoi that can 
be identified by studying the concordance of the search term Third World are 
summarized in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Topoi discussed in relation to the Third World in the BNP subcorpus. 
 Topoi Frequency 
1 Britain will become a Third World country 33 
2 Too many Third World immigrants 24 
3 Increased criminality 16 
4 Third World immigrants steal jobs 11 
5 Third World cultures are inferior or incompatible with British law 9 
6 Britain is colonized 8 
7 Immigration costs too much 8 
8 High birth rates 7 
9 Increased corruption 7 
10 Generally decreased standards (especially in the NHS) 7 
11 Third World immigrants have been imported in order to vote for Labour 3 
12 The BNP will rebuild Third World economies 3 
13 Bad behaviour 2 
14 Low border security 2 
15 More diseases 2 
16 Increased criminality, more diseases and higher living costs 1 
17 Third World immigration is bad for the British gene bank 1 
18 Third World elections are laughable 1 
19 Britain is being ghettoized 1 
20 Third World languages are a threat to the status of English 1 
21 People should emigrate to the Third World instead 1 
22 Britain steal professionals from the Third World 1 
23 Less trade with the Third World 1 
 
Lakoff and Wehling (2012) claim that specific issues activate wider 
ideological frames. The specific issue here, the Third World, is connected to 
almost every political area, e.g. economy (line 23), law (lines 3 and 5), healthcare 
(lines 10 and 15), government/governance (line 9), security (line 14), labour (lines 
4 and 22), constitution questions (line 18). It seems then, that by knowing what 
the BNP has to say about the Third World, you also understand much of its 
political values, at least those exoterically available. Despite the focus on the 
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Third World and immigration, it is not fair to say that the BNP are focusing 
exclusively on these issues. Rather, I support the claim made by Richardson 
(2011), who chooses to view it as a single-explanation rather than single-issue 
party (p. 43). 
The BNP compares increased immigration to colonialism, which sets them 
apart from other parties on the British political scene. The BNP is not, however, 
alone in adopting and adapting the concept of colonialism. In the UKIP 
subcorpus, there are two instances of the adjectival form colonial as a description 
of EU trade policies, and global warming is described as a new form of 
colonialism. Alliance, a non-sectarian Northern Irish party with one seat in the 
House of Commons, is, as far as I know, the only other British political party to 
discuss the matter of colonialism in its 2010 general election manifesto, although 
implicitly. Immigration is described as a “reversal of the historic trend whereby 
Ireland exported its people to other parts of the British Isles, North America and 
Australia” (Alliance, 2010, p. 30). The way Alliance conceptualizes emigration is 
interesting; export implies dehumanization by treating people as goods, but it is a 
question about dehumanization of an in-group; the Irish. BNP and UKIP do not 
use export in this sense, however, both parties use import in reference to out-
groups. Table 19 contains all occurrences of import in the BNP subcorpus. 
 
Table 19. Concordance of the lexeme IMPORT in the BNP subcorpus. 
1 Jefferson - Britain’s fastest growing  import a horrific crime wave from the third world 
2 to the British people, which is that if you  import vast numbers of people from the Third World 
3 British National Party has warned, if you  import the Third World into Britain, the end result 
4 of people has created the need to  import yet more immigrants to help provide those 
5 National Party has warned, if you  import  the Third World into Britain, the end result 
6 of mass immigration brought about to  import  Labour voters from the Third World, these 
7 Vince Cable actively seeks to  import  more foreign labour when we have millions 
8 in benefits, the Lib/Lab/Cons need to  import  migrant workers from across the globe to 
9 problem is to pay £191 million to  import  yet more refugees. The so-called Malaysia 
10 take on the native culture, and instead  import  their originating culture as part of a  
11 the globe to do these jobs. That these imported workers also cannot survive in Britain on 
12 crime wave, the costs of imprisoning the imported criminals and their defence and Human 
13 are not of indigenous origin but those imported to create the Marxist multi-cultural fantasy 
14 caused by the sheer numbers of people imported to enable these Ponzi schemes to appear 
 
The lines in Table 19 are examples of how IMPORT refers to human beings 
rather than goods, although there are naturally instances in which the search word 
refers to “normal trade”. It is not just a case of “British jobs for British workers”, 
but a serious concern that immigration will lead to various forms of criminal acts 
(see line 12 and 14) and a fear that immigration is a means of left-wing forces to 
cling on to power (see line 13). This sort of dehumanizing construction is present 
also in the UKIP subcorpus, although, as seen in Table 20, it is less frequent. 
 
Table 20. Concordance of the lexeme IMPORT in the UKIP subcorpus. 
1 At the simplistic level we are now seeing  imported electricians and the like coming in 
2 EU Commission President, Mr Barroso, talks of  importing 50 million Africans over the coming 
3 provide training for British workers rather than  import skills from overseas. Work permits  
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Line 2 resembles the type of quantitative description frequent in the BNP 
subcorpus. Line 1 and 3 concern “import” of labour; line 3 in particular is just a 
more elegant paraphrasing of the slogan “British jobs for British people” (see 
chapter 1.2). 
Nationalists are, despite what one might think, pathologically fixated on other 
countries than their own. This obsession has been identified by Billig (1995), who 
claims that the jumping between a general and a specific scale is endemic to 
nationalist discourse; “’[w]e’ claim to look beyond ‘our’ boundaries, even when 
seeking to close those boundaries” (p. 82). In fact, the BNP and UKIP make 2,082 
and 2,033 references to 109 and 96 other nation-states and nationalities 
respectively in their articles. When these references are grouped according to a 
narrower geographical nomenclature, UKIP’s emphasis on the EU is once again 
corroborated. 
 
Figure 12. Distribution of nationality words in the BNP and UKIP subcorpora. 
 
 
References to Britain itself are not included here. References to countries 
within the EU are almost twice as frequent in the UKIP subcorpus, and combined 
with references to other non-EU countries in Europe amount to 77% of all 
references. BNP on the other hand makes numerous references to Asian (19%), 
Middle Eastern (15%) and African (10%) countries. The large number of 
references to Asian and African countries does not necessarily entail an extension 
of the core out-group, but rather supports the large body of statistical work on 
BNP membership and voting behaviour which emphasize the Muslim aspect. The 
Muslim effect on BNP support is well-known and seen as the main component of 
out-group construction. John et al. (2006) found a positive correlation between 
support for the BNP and the presence of Bangladeshi or Pakistani groups (pp. 
16f). Similarly, Ford and Goodwin (2010) find that Muslim presence (particularly 
in the North of England) is associated with a higher level of BNP support, but that 
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this applies to Pakistani populations rather than Bangladeshi. However, they find 
no correlation between support for the BNP and the presence of non-Muslim 
Asians. Moreover, support for the BNP seems to be lower in areas with bigger 
black populations (pp. 16, 23). Biggs and Knauss’ (2012) multilevel analysis of 
white membership showed that the number of white BNP members is statistically 
higher in areas with highly segregated South Asian groups than in black 
neighbourhoods (p. 641). 
Ford and Goodwin (2010) suggest that their findings are indicative of a 
modern BNP with a more subtle appeal. While the out-group of the progenitor, 
the National Front, included all non-whites, Ford and Goodwin suggest that the 
BNP shows increased acceptance for Indian and Caribbean populations but 
increased intolerance for Muslim minorities in (pp. 16, 18). While it seems naïve 
to assume that the BNP would ever change its view of non-white communities, 
one of Ford and Goodwin’s conclusions seems more plausible, namely that the 
BNP has “shift[ed] its programmatic emphasis […] towards white anxieties over 
the more socially and geographically segregated Muslim minorities who can more 
easily be stigmatized as hostile to British values and supportive of terrorism” (p. 
18). This can be corroborated by looking more closely at the number of references 
the party makes to other nations. The Middle East accounts for only 15% of all 
references in the corpus; however, 72% of the references to African nations are in 
fact references to North African, mainly Muslim countries. Similarly, the Asian 
countries that are most frequently discussed in BNP texts are Turkey, India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh; all countries with significant Muslim populations. The 
shear number of national attributes found in the corpus could suggest that the 
BNP’s out-groups are fuzzy and that this fuzziness is a sign that the party has 
become more acceptant of non-white communities. On the other hand, a less 
specified out-group does not entail a less demarcated in-group. Increased 
awareness of the outside world and references to it can in this case be used as 
means of self-identification, i.e. “we are what they are not”. 
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6 Conclusions and future studies 
The aim of this paper was to compare to what degree the BNP and UKIP use 
language in order to construct in-groups and out-groups. Using a corpus 
containing authentic BNP and UKIP articles and policy documents, I have studied 
on lexical items and their relation with the discursive strategies nomination 
(attribution of identifying word form) and predication (attribution of quality). In 
the analysis of the in-group, the focus was on the parties themselves. I 
investigated what word form of self-reference the parties prefer when addressing 
potential voters, what competence they claim as unique, what qualities they do not 
want to be associated with and what qualities they attribute to each other. The 
analysis of out-groups focused on immigration and how this group is nominated 
and predicated in terms of legal status, quantity and origin. 
The in-group analysis was concerned with the parties themselves. The BNP 
and UKIP stand out from other parties on the British political scene in that their 
names mirror a holistic approach to the UK electorate, although both parties are 
primarily English rather than British phenomena. A quantitative analysis showed 
that both parties have increased their use of party name on behalf of the more 
inclusive but less specific pronoun we, which goes against the general trend. This 
can be interpreted as a sign of growing self-confidence and as an attempt to 
distance oneself from the established parties (which prefer we as form of self-
reference) by creating a distinct linguistic profile. 
The investigation of party image showed that both parties mix ideological and 
concrete political statements when claiming uniqueness. Both parties claim to be 
alone in wanting to leave the EU and solve the immigration issue, and both parties 
make use of value statements that are hard to measure. Two ideological types of 
themes can be linked to the BNP; an ultranationalist and a traditional left-wing 
one. UKIP seems to focus on the more banal and concrete issues in society, such 
as garbage collection or closing of pubs. 
A lot can be understood about the parties’ self-perception by looking at 
negation. There is a clear difference in how the parties perceive their own critics; 
the BNP has to defend itself from accusations of being racist, fascist, xenophobic 
and anti-Semitic while simultaneously arguing for the necessity of racism. The 
accusations that UKIP has to meet are much milder. 
The BNP and UKIP refer to each other in news articles, but to a limited 
degree. Despite being lumped together by the media, there are few instances in 
which the parties distance themselves from each other. Moreover, the tone is not 
as aggressive as might be expected. Both parties make frequent reference to the 
traditional big parties and seem to take on the opposition role vis-à-vis the 
establishment. UKIP does, however, distance itself from the BNP by attacking the 
party’s ideology, while the BNP’s tactic seems to be to simply dismiss UKIP as a 
weak, manipulated constellation. 
The out-group analysis was concerned with immigration. The corpus analysis 
showed that immigration and immigrant(-s) are salient items in both party 
subcorpora and in both news articles and policy documents, thus motivating 
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further enquiry. The distribution of these two terms shows that the abstract 
immigration is preferred in policy documents by both parties, while the concrete 
immigrant(-s) dominates in news articles. This could suggest that both parties 
make an effort to use a more abstract and conventional language in policy 
documents, which are texts mainly produced for non-members. Articles are 
mainly aimed at the in-group, i.e. members who regularly visit the party websites 
in order to keep à jour, which could explain the inconsistency in referencing. 
Moreover, the collocational analysis of immigration showed that the parties’ 
names or constituent parts are among the ten most frequent collocations, thus 
underlying the salience of the immigration issue in BNP and UKIP discourse. 
The collocational analysis generated results that suggested that legal status, 
quantity and origin were among the most important components of the parties’ 
immigration discourses. An investigation of the distribution of asylum seeker(-s), 
immigrant(-s) and refugee(-s) showed that the BNP makes frequent use of all 
three, although mostly in news articles and mostly in order to create negative 
discourse prosody. Asylum seeker(-s) and immigrant(-s) were evenly distributed in 
UKIP articles and policy documents, although the frequency was lower as 
compared to the BNP. 
Both parties foreground the (il)legal status of immigrants; illegal is one of the 
strongest attributive collocate of immigrant(-s), and the adjective that most 
frequently collocates with asylum seeker is bogus. Refugee is the least frequent of 
the word forms researched but perhaps the one that reveals the most about the two 
parties’ view on immigration and how the question should be linguistically 
approached. While UKIP adopts a technical definition of refugee, for example by 
citing the UN Refugee Convention, the BNP uses this term interchangeably and 
even together with asylum seeker, immigrant and various negative attributes. 
A search for numerical quantifications in relation to the target words asylum 
seeker(-s), immigrants(-s) and refugee(-s) shows that exact specifications are rare, 
although marginally more frequent in BNP discourse. However, a collocational 
analysis shows that both parties use quantifying attributes such as mass, huge, 
high and unlimited frequently to describe immigration. Both parties conceptualize 
immigrants as uncontrollable natural forces, e.g. as waves. Claims have been 
made that this is a naturalized metaphor, but it is far from neutral; a cross-corpus 
investigation shows that this type of metaphor has mainly negative discourse 
prosody. 
One of the more tangible differences between the parties’ construction of 
immigration concerns their attribution of national origin. The BNP’s focus on 
Islam and the Third World as well as UKIP’s focus on Europe are mirrored in 
their immigration discourses. To the BNP, immigrants arrive from all over the 
world, but primarily from the Third World and other non-European countries. To 
UKIP, an immigrant is an Eastern European. UKIP is also the only party to talk 
about positive waves of immigration, although constructing it as a historic 
anomaly. 
The in-group analysis showed that there are functional and formal similarities 
between the strategies used by the parties to present themselves, e.g. the choice to 
use party name on behalf of pronoun. It also showed that there is ideological 
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overlapping (immigration, EU) but that they champion slightly different policies 
(more concrete/less concrete). The out-group analysis showed that designation of 
out-groups is a vital part of BNP and UKIP discourse. While the function, the 
creation of the Other, is the same, different “core out-groups” are identifiable 
(people from Eastern Europe and the Third World respectively). Based on data 
presented and discussed in the in-group and out-group analyses, I conclude that 
both the BNP and UKIP speak the same language of differentiation. The 
principles of said language are the same, namely to separate us from them; what 
sets the BNP and UKIP apart are nothing but fine adjustments of parameters. As 
far as classification is concerned, the BNP’s ethnic nationalist label has once 
again been corroborated, and while UKIP does not belong to the same nationalist 
sphere, it is obvious that it is not fully a civic nationalist party either, e.g. 
signalled by the singling out of people (Eastern Europeans). 
Over the last few years, terrorist attacks committed by Islamists and 
Islamophobes have brought the issue of us vs. them to the fore. More research on 
perspectivization is needed, not only in the study of nationalist groups but in 
analyses of the establishment as well. The hope is that politicians will not be able 
to sell simple solutions if they are forced to clarify who will be negatively 
affected. For the last decade, much scholarship has focused on the BNP. From an 
academic point of view, each analysis of the BNP seems to have been a battle, a 
battle in which the pen proved mightier than the sword, or so it seems at the 
moment
24
. As the public is becoming increasingly aware of the existence of 
UKIP, it is my hope that the party will undergo the same scrutiny as the BNP. The 
Discourse-Historical Approach is a suitable framework as it allows for 
comparison through time and space. 
As nationalist groups have learnt to work across borders, so must scholars. 
Increased interdisciplinarity and less ostrich-like behaviour are needed if all facets 
of such a complicated organism as a political party are to be understood. Linguists 
need to interact with politicians; talking to politicians is not the prerogative of 
political scientists. Similarly, spoken data are not the exclusive property of 
phoneticians. I conducted a pair of interviews for this paper in order to ascertain 
more information about text production circumstances, however, I have realized 
that interviews can and need to be incorporated into the data set to a larger degree 
than they are today (for an excellent argumentation in favour of including 
interviews with politicians in studies of the extreme right, see Goodwin, 2008). 
Two chapters had to be dropped from the analysis due to space restrictions. 
The final section of the immigration chapter would have asked the mock question 
“how do we get rid of ‘them’?” The other was supposed to investigate the parties’ 
conceptualization of Islam. The BNP and UKIP are anti-immigration parties, 
which entails that they advocate policies that will either halt immigration or have 
immigrants deported. It is not important which party makes the most use of the 
word form deport; what is interesting is how the parties motivate such ideas. Ideas 
concerning deportation, immigration and international aid typically rest on an us-
them foundation where decisions to help or not to help people are based on how 
                                                 
24
 A battle is but a meronym of war. 
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they are perspectivized vis-à-vis the parties themselves. In the case of Islam, 
initial corpus searches showed that UKIP has more in common with the BNP than 
has been manifested in literature so far, which motivates further comparisons not 
only between the BNP and UKIP, but between UKIP and other extremist 
organizations. 
BNP and UKIP are often labelled as either single-issue or single-explanation 
parties, but it is difficult to assess the validity of such claims because of researcher 
bias or simply because it is difficult to delineate one question from another. 
Advancements in semantic tagging has, however, offered a way of developing 
easily reproducible research methods applicable to many parties in order to get a 
snapshot picture of “where the parties stand now”. With a semantically tagged 
corpus, a researcher can use the same search words that have been used in this 
thesis, e.g. immigration, but instead of “counting collocates”, investigate with 
what semantic groups the search words co-occur. 
Whoever said politics is boring is bound to change their mind in the years to 
come as we are living in exciting times, given that you find the thought of a fast-
changing electoral landscape exciting, that is. In January 2013, Prime Minister 
David Cameron announced that there will be an in-out referendum on the EU if 
the Conservatives win the elections in May 2015. UKIP was founded as an anti-
EU organization, and as the analysis has shown, the prospect of leaving the 
European Union is the party’s main driving force. If the British people indeed 
chose to leave the EU, as suggested by polls, UKIP can either dissolve or re-adapt 
its policies in order to survive. If Britain remains a member of the EU, the anti-EU 
movement is bound to lose momentum, which would also be detrimental to UKIP. 
That might, however, result in renewed interest in more extreme organizations 
seeking to leave the EU using non-democratic means. Regardless of the outcome, 
it is my hope that this paper will be used as a point of departure in future 
longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of the BNP and UKIP. Group divisions 
are not eternal, and the prospect of an upcoming referendum might have an impact 
on the parties’ construction of their in-groups and out-groups. 
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